The Security Council of Armenia notified Russia on March 6 that its border guards, dependent on the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), had to leave the Yerevan international airport, where they have carried out auxiliary functions for more than three decades. The measure joins others taken in recent months by the Government of Armenia that have angered Moscow, such as the ratification of the Rome Statute – which recognizes the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court and, therefore, would force the arrest of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in case of setting foot on Armenian territory—or the decision to “de facto freeze” his participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), known as the “Russian NATO” while it is assessed, according to the Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinián, whether to permanently leave the organization. All of these decisions place the small Caucasian country on a line divergent from that of the Kremlin and are part of a policy of the current Government to “diversify” its alliances, reduce its traditional dependence on Russia and get closer to the West. But they also represent a tremendously risky bet.
“We regret that the Armenian leaders seem to have made the decision to consistently deteriorate relations with the Russian Federation,” criticized the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, during the Diplomatic Forum in Antalya (Turkey) held on the first weekend of March.
When Pashinián came to power in 2018 on the shoulders of a popular revolt against the old and corrupt establishment who had been ruling the country for decades, was very careful not to anger the Kremlin. Contrary to what had happened in other revolts in the former Soviet space, no EU or US flags were raised in the Armenian squares. The revolt, a collaborator of the political leader stressed at the time, “did not have a geopolitical aspect.” Pashinyan himself underlined the importance of relations with Russia through numerous visits and telephone conversations with Putin.
But the relationship has cooled in recent years. The Government of Armenia considers that Russia, its military supporter and CSTO partner, has abandoned it in the face of attacks by Azerbaijan (which does not belong to the military organization led by Moscow) on its territory, and has failed to fulfill its task of protecting the Armenians from Nagorno Karabakh, leaving the way open for their ethnic cleansing.
”At the moment it is not clear what will happen to Armenian-Russian relations, whether it is a paradigm shift or whether, after a certain tension, things will return to normal,” explains Benjamin Poghosián, an analyst at the Policy Research Institute. Application (APRI) of Yerevan. It is true that the decision to withdraw the guards assigned to the FSB from the airport of the Armenian capital is merely symbolic because they were only a few in a service—passport control—that is carried out mainly by Armenian officials. It would be different, Poghosian maintains, if a similar decision were made regarding the 1992 agreement according to which Russian guards guard the Armenian borders with Turkey and Iran – it is a contingent of Russian officers in which Armenian soldiers also serve – or that of 1995 that regulates the Russian military base in Gyumri (northwest Armenia), with capacity for between 2,000 and 3,000 Russian soldiers. The head of Armenian diplomacy, Ararat Mirzoyan, clarified that the decision refers “only to the airport” and is due to the fact that Armenia has the capacity to offer these services “independently.”
Steps towards Brussels
In the last two years, Yerevan has taken steps in the direction of Brussels. It has signed several cooperation agreements with the European Union, approved the deployment of a European observation mission on its border with Azerbaijan (which has gone down badly in Moscow and Baku) and at the beginning of the month several Armenian leaders assured that their country is considering requesting accession to the community bloc. Earlier this month, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of the EU strengthening relations with Armenia and eventually launching accession negotiations.
In addition, Yerevan has approved the purchase of weapons from France (also from India) and has signed a military cooperation and training agreement with Greece. “The acquisition of military material from Russia has fallen from [suponer el] 96% to less than 10%. This means that Armenia is implementing a diversification policy that requires partners not only in the West, but also in Asia and elsewhere. Big changes are taking place. “Armenia is diversifying its economy and security,” stressed the Secretary of the Armenian Security Council, Armen Grigorian.
“We cannot prohibit them from making statements or announcements about the future of our ties,” said the Russian Foreign Minister, but warned that his country will “reconsider” the future of relations with Armenia if it continues to lean towards the West. The Ministry’s spokesperson, Maria Zajarova, also warned that these actions could create “irreparable damage” to relations between both countries and pose “a serious risk” to Armenian sovereignty. Anger from the Kremlin could range from economic retaliation – last year the import of certain Armenian products was temporarily banned – to giving the green light to a new offensive by Azerbaijan, a constant fear among Armenian society. In fact, there seems to be better harmony between Moscow and Baku, despite Azerbaijan being a key supplier of hydrocarbons to the EU.
”Armenia is carrying out a risky policy, since it has not yet signed a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, it does not have normal relations with Turkey [ambos países mantienen cerradas sus fronteras con Armenia, al este y al oeste] and wants to distance itself from Russia without any ally to replace it,” says Oleg Ignatov, analyst at the Crisis Group. “I think Pashinian is overestimating the West’s willingness to protect and help Armenia,” he adds.
Not in vain, several diplomatic sources consulted rule out any type of European military support and see the possibility of opening EU accession negotiations as very distant, a measure of political support that has been granted to other countries such as Ukraine, Moldova or neighboring Georgia. “In case of Azerbaijani aggression, the only country willing to defend Armenia militarily is Iran. The problem is that if Armenia leans too far towards the West, that will also alienate Iran,” says Poghosián. Ignatov agrees that all regional powers—Russia, Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan—are opposed to Armenia inviting powers from outside the area to have a greater presence in the Caucasus.
The dependency is not only military. Last year, trade between Armenia and Russia reached a record level. It is due both to the immigration of tens of thousands of Russians who have escaped the war mobilization and have settled in Yerevan and to the fact that Armenia has become one of the key countries to circumvent Western sanctions by re-exporting products to Russia. sanctioned. Moscow, therefore, cannot retaliate against Yerevan without harming itself, but if it did so it would be a very hard blow to the economy of a poor country like Armenia, especially at a time when it is struggling to integrate the more than 100,000 refugees from Nagorno Karabakh (equivalent to 4% of Armenia’s population) who survive thanks to international aid from the UN and the EU and whose financing must be renegotiated in the coming months.
Follow all the international information on Facebook y Xor our weekly newsletter.
to continue reading
_