Between 2022 and 2025, North Korea secured an estimated 22 billion dollars—roughly Rp 393 trillion—in foreign revenue. According to Bloomberg reports cited by Kompas.com, this massive influx was primarily driven by heavy ammunition exports and troop deployments supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine, nearly quadrupling Pyongyang’s earnings from the preceding four-year period.
The Artillery Lifeline for Moscow
When the Kremlin faced severe munitions shortages following its large-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine, Pyongyang sat atop vast, aging stockpiles of Soviet-era weaponry. Here is why that matters: those dated inventories instantly became a lucrative economic engine for Kim Jong Un. Ukrainian intelligence estimates indicate that North Korea supplied up to 50 percent of Russia’s requirements for crucial 122-millimeter and 152-millimeter artillery shells by late 2025.
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This massive transfer of military hardware bypassed traditional global trade lanes, operating entirely in the shadows of heavy United Nations sanctions. Andrei Lankov, a specialist on Korean studies and director at the Korea Risk Group, noted in a Kyiv Post interview cited by Kompas.com that Pyongyang’s standing is now stronger than it has been in 35 tahun terakhir (the last 35 years). Lankov characterized the large-scale arms sales as an extraordinary windfall for the North Korean state.
Boots on the Ground and Financial Returns
Hardware is only part of the equation. According to intelligence briefings outlined by Kompas.com and Tribunnews.com, the regime also monetized its personnel. Between 16,000 and 22,000 North Korean military personnel were deployed to Russia. Each soldier commands a monthly salary of roughly 2,000 dollars—about Rp 35 million—with additional payouts reported for soldiers who died in battle.
South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) analyzed these developments, noting in late 2024 reports that Pyongyang moved swiftly to lock Moscow into a long-term strategic embrace. By securing guaranteed hard currency and vital commodities like food supplies, the regime temporarily insulated itself from domestic economic collapse.
To grasp the sheer scale of this financial transformation, consider the comparative economic metrics reported by intelligence and financial monitors across the region:
| Economic & Military Metric | Data / Estimate | Source Reference |
|---|---|---|
| Estimated Foreign Revenue (2022–2025) | $22 billion (~Rp 393 trillion) | Bloomberg / Kompas.com |
| Artillery Shell Supply Share (Late 2025) | Up to 50% of 122mm and 152mm needs | Ukrainian Intelligence / Kompas.com |
| Deployed Military Personnel | 16,000 to 22,000 troops | Kompas.com / Tribunnews.com |
| Monthly Soldier Compensation | ~$2,000 (~Rp 35 million) per soldier | National Intelligence Service / Tribunnews.com |
| Reported North Korean GDP Growth (2025) | 3,5 persen | Bank of Korea / IDN Times |
Broader Shocks to the Global Economy
The injection of billions in wartime capital did not just pad state coffers; it fundamentally shifted macroeconomic indicators inside the hermit kingdom. South Korea’s central bank, the Bank of Korea, estimates that North Korea’s economy grew by 3,5 persen in 2025, marking the third year of positive growth despite international isolation.
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But there is a digital twist to Pyongyang’s revenue generation. Beyond traditional munitions and manpower, state-backed hacking collectives continue to siphon massive sums from global financial networks. Blockchain analysis firm TRM Labs reports that North Korean cyber units are responsible for stealing over 70 percent of the world’s cryptocurrency, laundering those digital assets through organized crime networks in neighboring China to secure usable foreign bank accounts.
What Lies Ahead for Regional Stability
While the immediate financial cushion has relieved acute domestic food and currency crises inside North Korea, long-term structural questions remain unanswered. Analysts at Seoul’s INSS have cautioned that Pyongyang’s utility to Moscow may diminish once active hostilities in Ukraine eventually subside. If and when that happens, North Korea risks losing its primary diplomatic shield and economic sponsor.
For now, however, the war in Eastern Europe has provided Kim Jong Un with a window of financial resilience. As long as the artillery shells keep moving west, the hard currency will keep flowing east.
