2023-12-18 11:21:00
Billboard in Kupiansk, Ukraine, recruiting people to join the Ukrainian army (Europa Press)
The new recruits came from very diverse backgrounds, but they had something in common: after rudimentary training in Western Europe, none of them expected to be assigned to an assault unit in the hottest part of the Ukrainian front. Some had enlisted voluntarily, hoping to be given places in units that fit their profiles: as drone operators or artillerymen. Others were uprooted from their villages without warning. An elderly recruit didn’t even have the chance to pick up his false teeth. After less than a week in the trenches of Donbas, eastern Ukraine, the platoon of 20 had been reduced to six. Three had died in combat, three were seriously wounded.
This is one of the worst recruiting stories, but it is by no means an isolated case. Ukraine is desperately seeking to plug its front lines against new Russian attacks. No army offers guarantees to new recruits about where they will be deployed, much less in wartime, and assault brigades are among the most desperate units.
But what legal experts describe as a “deployment lottery” is putting a strain on the recruiting process. The army chiefs strive to fill the positions with volunteers; some are resorting to recruiting raids at gyms and shopping malls. Few who enlist in this way become good soldiers. “We see people between 45 and 47 years old,” complains a senior officer. “They are out of breath when they get to the front.”
Aware of the problem, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense began working on a new mobilization strategy in September. Ministry spokesman Illarion Pavliuk says part of the problem lies in the military’s success: Many citizens no longer see the war in the existential terms they did immediately after Russia’s invasion in February 2022. “Some mistakenly think that There is someone else who can do the job for them,” he says.
The reforms aim to give more options to those who are undecided: new recruits can, more or less, sign up for a specific position. A new digital registry will allow the Ministry to better understand Ukraine’s human resources. There will be a clearer system of breaks and rotations. Over time, volunteers will be mobilized for a finite period, not indefinitely as is the case now.
There are several examples of successful recruitment campaigns in individual units. The 3rd Assault Brigade, created nine months into the war as a branch of the Ukrainian special forces, is perhaps the most visible. Skyscraper-sized advertisements in Ukrainian cities glorify life as one of the brigade’s stormtroopers, killing goblin-like caricatures of evil. But no less important is the brigade’s reputation for competent command, good equipment and low desertion rates. New recruits typically undergo months of training, as opposed to the norm of one month.
Brigade spokesperson Khrystyna Bondarenko says there is no shortage of volunteers. By early next year, the brigade will be the largest in Ukraine, similar in size to a NATO division. (The Ukrainian army has no divisions.) Most of her new recruits are under 25, and she rejects 150 applications a month from minors. “No one says there are millions of people waiting to fight in Avdiivka [una ciudad de Donbás que recientemente ha sido escenario de encarnizados combates]”, it states. “But there are people you can work with.”
Russia also has difficulties mobilizing the troops it needs. Their tactic of throwing large numbers of men against defended positions, often without proper equipment, can result in daily losses of up to 1,000 men. But the fundamentals point to a gigantic challenge for Ukraine. With a pool of potential soldiers about four times larger, Russia appears favored in the long term. In its prisons and poorer areas, joining the army seems rational.
Elsewhere, the Kremlin has been able to meet its minimal needs by secretly recruiting for a full-scale war that it still pretends is not happening. If it needed to increase its mobilization, the Kremlin would have to admit that Russia is at war. This would have political consequences.
Ukrainians critical of the kyiv government, meanwhile, accuse the country of only “pretending to mobilize.” Viktor Kevlyuk, a retired colonel who oversaw the implementation of the policy of mobilizing the western half of the country from 2014 – when Russia first invaded – until 2021, says Ukraine risks falling into a trap. In his opinion, Russia will intensify its mobilization once the presidential elections in March are over. (Hur, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, agrees.)
Vladimir Putin has already signed an edict increasing the size of the Russian armed forces by 170,000 troops. Colonel Kevlyuk argues that Ukraine must respond with a national mobilization of industry, government and resources. In his opinion, the often decadent lifestyle of those who enjoy the security of kyiv must change. “This is not the time for imported smoked salmon.”
Throughout the war, Volodymyr Zelensky has resisted the maximalist requests of his soldiers, much to their chagrin. His top generals, for example, have pushed to lower the age at which non-reservists can be mobilized, which is currently 27 years old. Others have proposed stricter enforcement of mobilization laws.
The President has opposed it partly for political reasons: he does not want to unnecessarily irritate the population. But Zelensky is also moved by nobler concerns. “Zelensky wants to do right by the Ukrainians,” says a high-level government source. “He does not want to be a dictator.”
Difficult decisions lie ahead. For Colonel Kevlyuk, the army is a beast that must be fed: “We have no choice but to be bloodthirsty,” he says. But some officials prefer a more consensual approach. The high-level source foresees media campaigns promoting national sacrifice and warning that Russia continues to represent an existential threat. “If we lose, it will be bad for all of us,” he says.
The task is to convince potential recruits. “Conductor”, one of the men deployed in the ill-fated unit in Donbas, says he is committed to serving his country, “but only in a way that can be useful.” Meanwhile, he is busy “24/7” securing a transfer away from the assault forces. “You can’t discard people’s lives like that,” he says.
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