Earlier this week, Novel Zealand Defence Force personnel participated in a classified wargame simulating the aftermath of a Russian nuclear detonation in low Earth orbit—a scenario designed to test responses to catastrophic satellite network failure. The exercise, informed by growing international concern over Moscow’s potential deployment of orbital nuclear weapons, highlights how space-based threats are rapidly evolving from theoretical concerns into concrete military planning considerations for mid-sized powers like New Zealand. As global reliance on satellite infrastructure for communications, navigation, and financial systems deepens, the prospect of deliberate orbital disruption raises urgent questions about resilience, deterrence, and the fragility of interconnected systems upon which modern economies depend.
The Wargame That Shook Wellington’s Strategic Calculus
According to RNZ’s reporting, the NZDF exercise—conducted in coordination with Australian and U.S. Space commands—focused on cascading failures following a high-altitude nuclear burst, which could disable or destroy satellites through electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects and radiation damage. While New Zealand does not operate military satellites, it relies heavily on commercial and allied systems for maritime surveillance, weather forecasting, and secure communications, particularly across its vast exclusive economic zone and Antarctic responsibilities. The scenario forced planners to confront a stark reality: in minutes, a single orbital detonation could degrade GPS accuracy, disrupt satellite phones, and blind intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets critical to regional security operations.
What we have is not merely a theoretical concern for Wellington. In 2023, a solar storm caused minor disruptions to New Zealand’s power grid and radio communications, offering a small-scale preview of what deliberate EMP attacks could achieve at scale. The wargame’s timing is significant—it follows months of heightened rhetoric from Russian officials about countering Western space dominance, including repeated references to developing “asymmetric capabilities” in orbit. Though Moscow has not confirmed deploying nuclear weapons in space, U.S. Intelligence assessments from late 2025 indicated active research into orbital nuclear payloads capable of generating wide-area EMP effects without requiring atmospheric detonation.
When Orbit Becomes a Battleground: Global Supply Chains at Risk
The global economy’s dependence on satellite infrastructure is often underestimated. Over 90% of international financial transactions rely on GPS timing signals for synchronization, while maritime shipping—responsible for 80% of global trade by volume—depends on satellite navigation for route optimization and collision avoidance. A widespread satellite outage could trigger cascading failures across logistics networks, delaying shipments, increasing insurance premiums, and disrupting just-in-time manufacturing schedules worldwide. For New Zealand, an export-driven economy where agricultural products like dairy and meat account for over 55% of total merchandise exports, such disruptions could severely impact cold chain logistics and real-time market access to key buyers in China, the U.S., and Europe.
Beyond trade, the financial sector faces acute vulnerability. High-frequency trading algorithms, ATM networks, and interbank settlement systems all require microsecond-level timing precision provided by atomic clocks on GPS satellites. A degradation or loss of this timing layer could force markets into safer, slower modes of operation, increasing transaction costs and reducing liquidity. In a 2024 study, Lloyd’s of London estimated that a major GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) outage could cost the global economy up to $1 billion per day, with ripple effects persisting for weeks due to inventory backlogs and contractual penalties.
Historical Echoes: From Starfish Prime to Space Deterrence Theory
The concept of using nuclear weapons in space is not new. In 1962, the United States conducted Starfish Prime, a high-altitude nuclear test over the Pacific that produced an EMP damaging electronics in Hawaii—over 1,300 kilometers away—and temporarily disabled one-third of the low Earth orbit satellites then in operation. The test contributed directly to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. Yet today, emerging doctrines in Moscow and Beijing appear to be testing the boundaries of that prohibition, exploring whether nuclear effects in space could be achieved without violating the treaty’s letter—such as through detonations just above the Kármán line or using specialized warheads designed to maximize EMP while minimizing fission fallout.
This evolving strategic calculus has prompted renewed debate within NATO and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) about strengthening norms against the weaponization of space. However, consensus remains elusive, particularly as China and Russia block efforts to adopt a legally binding treaty preventing an arms race in orbit. Instead, voluntary transparency measures and norms of responsible behavior have become the focus—though enforcement remains weak without verification mechanisms.
Expert Perspectives: Deterrence, Resilience, and the New Cold Frontier
To understand the broader implications, I spoke with Dr. Mariana Fuentes, a space security researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), who noted:
“What we’re seeing is a shift from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial—states are investing in hardened satellites, disaggregated constellations, and rapid reconstitution capabilities not because they expect to fight a war in space, but because they fear being blinded early in a terrestrial conflict.”
Her assessment aligns with recent U.S. Space Force investments in proliferated low Earth orbit (PLEO) architectures, which aim to reduce vulnerability by distributing critical functions across hundreds of smaller, cheaper satellites.
Similarly, Commodore Stephen Courtney, Royal New Zealand Navy (Ret.) and former director of the NZDF’s Joint Centre for Operational Learning, emphasized the importance of allied interoperability:
“New Zealand may not launch rockets, but we contribute to maritime domain awareness, signals intelligence, and hosted payload opportunities. In a degraded space environment, our value lies in integrating with partners who can still see and communicate—while we adapt to operate with intermittent or degraded access.”
His comments reflect a growing recognition among smaller allies that resilience in space conflict may depend less on independent capabilities and more on being plug-and-play nodes within allied networks.
| Indicator | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Active satellites in orbit (2025) | 9,900+ | Union of Concerned Scientists |
| % of global maritime trade reliant on GPS | 80% | International Maritime Organization |
| Estimated daily global cost of major GNSS outage | $1 billion | Lloyd’s of London |
| NZ defence expenditure (2024/25) | NZ$5.3 billion | New Zealand Ministry of Defence |
| Percentage of NZ exports reliant on cold chain logistics | 55% | Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade |
The Takeaway: Preparing for a World Where the Sky Can Go Dark
The NZDF’s participation in this wargame is not an indication of imminent threat, but a prudent acknowledgment that the strategic landscape is shifting. As space becomes more congested, contested, and competitive, even nations without launch capabilities must harden their dependencies, diversify their sources of information, and invest in operational resilience. For New Zealand, that means continuing to deepen integration with Five Eyes partners, supporting norms that stigmatize irresponsible behavior in orbit, and ensuring that national infrastructure—from power grids to fishing vessels—can function when satellite signals fade.
More broadly, the episode serves as a reminder that security in the 21st century extends far beyond territorial borders and into the invisible domains that enable modern life. Whether it’s a tanker navigating the Tasman Sea, a farmer monitoring soil moisture via satellite, or a trader settling a transaction in microseconds, we all depend on the quiet constancy of orbit. Protecting that constancy isn’t just a military concern—it’s a civilizational one. As we look ahead, the question isn’t whether space will be contested—it’s how we ensure that contestation doesn’t come at the cost of the systems we rely on every day.
