A strategic analysis of maritime chokepoints reveals that the Strait of Hormuz can be effectively closed by the insurance market following a limited number of drone strikes, reducing tanker traffic from 56 vessels to just seven within 48 hours.
Data from Lloyd’s List, the maritime industry’s journal of record, indicates that in this scenario, the decline in traffic occurred without the deployment of naval blockades, the seeding of mines, or the physical seizure of the waterway. Instead, the disruption was driven by a surge in insurance premiums and risk assessments that rendered commercial transit financially unviable for the majority of the global fleet.
Of the remaining vessels that continued to transit the strait during the period of peak volatility, only one gas carrier and seven tankers were recorded. Three of these were identified as part of the “shadow fleet”—vessels that operate outside the purview of traditional Western insurance and regulatory frameworks, often to bypass international sanctions.
The Insurance Mechanism of Blockades
The “Hormuz Playbook” describes a shift in maritime warfare where financial levers replace kinetic force to achieve the effects of a blockade. In traditional naval warfare, a state must commit significant military assets to physically stop ships from entering a waterway. Under the insurance-driven model, a small number of drone strikes on commercial targets triggers a reclassification of the region as a “high-risk area” by underwriters.
Once insurance providers increase war-risk premiums or withdraw coverage entirely, ship owners face a choice: sail without insurance and risk total loss of the asset, or anchor in safer waters. This result is a “priced shut” chokepoint, where hundreds of vessels remain drifting in the Gulf of Oman, unable to enter the strait due to the cost of coverage rather than the presence of enemy warships.
Application to the Baltic and Black Seas
Strategic analysts are now examining whether this playbook could be applied by Russia in the Baltic and Black Seas. The vulnerability of these regions mirrors that of the Strait of Hormuz, as both rely on concentrated shipping lanes that are susceptible to asymmetric attacks. In the Black Sea, the use of sea drones and missile strikes has already altered shipping patterns, forcing a reliance on specific corridors or the use of unregulated vessels.
The transition to a “priced shut” strategy in Northern Europe or the Black Sea would require a similar pattern of low-cost, high-visibility attacks. By targeting a small number of vessels, an actor can create a perception of systemic risk that forces the global insurance market to react, effectively delegating the enforcement of a blockade to the private sector.
The Role of the Shadow Fleet
The persistence of shadow-fleet vessels during these disruptions highlights a growing gap in maritime security. Because these ships do not rely on the same insurance pools as the global commercial fleet, they are immune to the “pricing out” mechanism. These vessels often operate with obscured ownership, disabled automatic identification systems (AIS), and substandard maintenance, allowing them to maintain transit when traditional shipping ceases.
This creates a bifurcated maritime environment where regulated commercial shipping is paralyzed by risk management, while unregulated fleets continue to move commodities, potentially undermining the efficacy of international sanctions or diplomatic pressure.
Current maritime security protocols remain focused on naval escorts and physical deterrence. However, the ability of insurance markets to dictate the flow of global trade suggests that financial risk thresholds now serve as a primary vulnerability for critical maritime chokepoints.
The International Maritime Organization and global insurance syndicates have not issued new guidelines regarding the mitigation of these asymmetric, insurance-led disruptions.
