Sudan’s Descent: Why Revolutions Need More Than Hope
Just four years after jubilant crowds celebrated the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan is teetering on the brink of a catastrophic collapse, a chilling echo of the chaos engulfing Yemen and Libya. The recent eruption of fighting between rival military factions in Khartoum isn’t simply a power struggle; it’s a brutal illustration of how easily revolutions can unravel without sustained, strategic follow-through. Some 45 million Sudanese are effectively hostages in their own homes, and the escalating violence demands a deeper understanding of the systemic failures that brought the nation to this precipice.
From Carnival of Freedom to Collapsing State
The initial euphoria following Bashir’s removal in 2019 was palpable. I remember witnessing the “sit-in” in Khartoum – a vibrant, hopeful space where Sudanese citizens demanded a new future. But as the dust settled, a critical flaw emerged: the inability of civilian movements to translate popular momentum into lasting political power. While grassroots activism is potent in dismantling dictatorships, building the necessary leadership structures for complex negotiations proves far more challenging.
The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), the driving force behind the protests, exemplified this struggle. Dictatorships suppress individuals, but a post-dictatorship environment requires organized, hierarchical leadership to effectively bargain with established, disciplined institutions like the military. This structural weakness allowed the military – specifically the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti) – to dominate the transitional process.
The Perilous Power-Sharing Arrangement
The August 2019 transitional constitution, born from these uneven negotiations, effectively handed control to the SAF and RSF. While elections were promised, they were widely viewed as a mirage. Civilian Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, despite his best efforts, found himself constrained by a system designed to preserve military power. He recognized, as he shared with me during our interviews for “Sudan’s Unfinished Democracy,” that revolutions are cyclical, and the initial surge of reform is often followed by a counter-revolution.
This counter-revolution wasn’t confined to Khartoum. Outside the capital, particularly in Darfur, the RSF exploited existing ethnic tensions, orchestrating violence and displacing over 430,000 people. The brutality was brazen, with RSF soldiers openly discussing atrocities – like the burning of villages and the killing of civilians – as acts of retribution. These actions underscored a disturbing truth: there are no “good guys” in this conflict, only competing factions with a history of human rights abuses.
International Intervention and Unintended Consequences
The October 2021 military coup, which ousted Hamdok, exposed the flaws in international policy. The United States and the United Nations, in an attempt to restart the transition, pushed for a revised constitution that, in effect, returned power to Burhan. This approach, despite good intentions, was shortsighted. As many observers, including myself, argued, repeating a failed formula was unlikely to yield different results. Some activists even began to view the UN mission as an impediment to genuine democracy.
The attempt to unify the SAF and RSF, a key component of this international policy, proved particularly disastrous. This strategy mirrored failed unification processes in South Sudan, where similar efforts led to renewed bloodshed. The inherent tension between Burhan and Hemeti, fueled by competing ambitions and a power struggle, inevitably boiled over, triggering the current crisis. The situation highlights the dangers of imposing external solutions without a deep understanding of local dynamics.
The Broader Implications for Fragile States
Sudan’s descent serves as a stark warning about the fragility of revolutions and the complexities of post-conflict state-building. It demonstrates that removing a dictator is merely the first step – a necessary but insufficient condition for lasting change. Without robust institutions, inclusive governance, and a commitment to addressing underlying grievances, revolutions can easily be hijacked by entrenched power structures or descend into violent chaos. This isn’t unique to Sudan; similar patterns can be observed in countries facing instability around the world, from Myanmar to Tunisia.
The lesson from Sudan isn’t that revolutions are doomed to fail. Rather, it’s that they require sustained effort, strategic planning, and a realistic assessment of the challenges ahead. A nation’s political fortune is, as Sudanese activists have shown, an ongoing battle. While the current situation is dire, the hope for a democratic Sudan remains. But for now, the immediate priority is survival.
What are your thoughts on the role of international actors in preventing state collapse? Share your insights in the comments below!
