Nearly a year after Russia’s war with Ukraine began, the scenario for whether the war will continue to develop or cease is increasingly unclear, and it is expected to continue and may rage this spring, especially when fighting cannot be predicted how it will be stopped, which will depend on the expected outcome of the fighting, and the ability of Kiev and Moscow to persist in order to achieve their acceptable goals, and since neither side is currently interested in a diplomatic solution to the conflict, the , this war will not end anytime soon.
Under such circumstances, the position of the United States is considered to be one of the most important factors affecting the course of the war and its future direction. To shed light on America’s understanding of the nature of the balance of power on the ground, Washington’s position on current developments, and the likely scenarios that could unfold in the coming weeks and months, Al Jazeera interviewed Robert F. Pearson conducted the interview.
Pierson, whose research focuses on foreign and domestic policy in Russia and the former Soviet republics, has a forthcoming book, Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century.
Pierson holds a Ph.D. from Yale University, a master’s degree from Stanford University, and is a non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute.
The following is the full text of the interview:
- After a year of fierce fighting, has Russia’s ‘invasion’ of Ukraine achieved its purpose?
No, Russia has had to scale back its operational goals several times since the start of this war. Initially, it sought to quickly seize Kiev and overthrow Ukraine’s democratically elected government, and after that failed, it sought to seize and consolidate as much territory as possible in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Yes, the Russians made some progress in southern Ukraine, which allowed them to build a land bridge to the Crimea peninsula, but they suffered in the former occupied areas around Kharkov, Zaporizhia and Kherson significant losses, thus rendering Russia’s illegal annexation of these territories a fantasy. Russia now appears to have scaled back its ambitions to consolidate its control over all of Donetsk and Luhansk, though it has not yet fully captured them, as major offensive gains continue against Ukrainian forces crossing the line of contact.
All of this suggests that the “invasion” did not achieve its goals, which became narrower and narrower as the war progressed.
- The “invasion” did not serve its purpose, so do we expect Russia to be defeated in the war in Ukraine?
At this point, in my opinion, Russia’s defeat would be for Ukraine to expel all Russian troops from its territory by force. And that means a full withdrawal of Russian troops would not be part of a negotiated diplomatic solution, but could only be achieved on the battlefield with broad support and arms supplies from the West.
If Ukraine succeeds in pushing Russian forces out of its territory and regaining control of its borders, Russia may end its military operations, or it may continue its protracted firefight across fortified borders and neutral areas.
But either way, Russia’s hybrid political and information war against Ukraine will continue indefinitely, even after the fighting is over.
- If that happened, what would a Russian victory in the Ukraine war look like?
The Russian victory scenario begins when Western financial and military support for the Kiev government is significantly reduced, allowing Russia to make up for its recent losses. If Moscow manages to fully reoccupy the regions of Ukraine it annexed last year, it could declare the war over and its willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement. And this will inevitably lead to international pressure to force Zelensky to sit at the negotiating table. At that time, he will be in a weak position and forced to accept the fact that Russia has annexed Ukrainian territory.
But no Ukrainian leader can agree to such terms, and therefore, no peace agreement will be reached. In such a scenario, there could be a “no war, no peace” situation, as in the case of the Korean peninsula, with a military border running through central Ukraine.
- When and how is the war in Ukraine expected to end?
The fighting could eventually end without a formal peace agreement being signed, or it could stop without one.
Russia’s current political, informational, social and economic war against Ukraine will continue. Even with the establishment of military borders and the declaration of a ceasefire, tensions will continue and violence will be sporadic.
So the only difference between “victory for Ukraine” and “victory for Russia” is where those lines end up.
While I’m sure that’s how battles usually end, no one knows when that’s going to happen. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has given up on their stated goals in this war, and neither side is exhausted yet, so the fighting will continue and rage for the foreseeable future.
- The war broke out against the backdrop of discussions about the need for “Ukraine to remain neutral,” and after nearly a year of fighting, is this thinking still alive?
In a way, the question became irrelevant in the first weeks of the war. Today, even true Ukrainian neutrality is not enough for Putin to end the war. In any case, Ukrainian neutrality is completely non-existent today. If Ukraine continues to exist as a sovereign, independent and free state, it will forever be aligned with the West and against Russia, the foundation of which this Russian war has laid. And if Russia succeeds in its original political goal of controlling the Ukrainian government as a puppet regime, then, in this case, Ukraine will not remain neutral.
- After nearly a year of U.S. support, what can the Biden administration do now to help Ukraine?
The spring of 2023 will be a critical period for Ukraine, when it is expected to face a new round of Russian offensive from the Donbas region, at the same time, I expect Ukraine to be ready to fight back in the spring. Ukraine must be able to absorb and mitigate Russian military offensives in the east of the country while retaining sufficient strength to take advantage of counterattack opportunities and strategic territorial gains whenever and wherever possible.
Such success will require the United States to provide more weapons than it has promised so far: more tanks, long-range missile systems, and fighter jets, for example. Timing will also be an issue, as Ukraine needs the weapons now and most assessments are that it won’t receive enough for its next campaign in the near future. Therefore, the United States and its allies need to speed up and increase arms shipments to Ukraine before it is too late.
- Do you think Putin underestimated the Biden administration’s response to this move?
Yes. The scale of the strategic disaster that President Putin has created for Russia lies in his gross underestimation of the capabilities and resolve of the Ukrainian military, as well as the resolve of the United States to resist such an invasion. He also clearly underestimated the strength and unity of NATO, predicting that Europe’s energy dependence on Russia would drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies. Putin may have foreseen that he would complete the invasion without strategic consequences, as he did when he invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014. But this time, Putin has seriously miscalculated on this point.
- What have been the main geostrategic consequences of the war so far?
I think there are 3 important consequences: First, this catastrophic and costly war in Russia accelerated the demographic and economic decline that already existed in Russia before the war. It will take decades for Russia to recover from the aftermath of this war.
And that leads to a second consequence: Russia’s poor performance and aforementioned decline confirms that Russia is doomed in the 21st century to a secondary role that has been reduced to a second-class state. Although Russia will continue to exert influence in international politics, the competition, conflict and interaction between China and the United States will shape the international order in the next century. In short, international politics must be bipolar politics, not tripolar politics.
Third, China cannot but learn from this war in Ukraine. The United States has shown a firm determination to resist such a war, which may cause China to think twice about the Taiwan Strait issue.
- What do you think of Putin’s occasional threats to use nuclear weapons?
While we cannot completely ignore such threats, I view them as tactics designed to scare the West and complicate further support for Ukraine. At this point, I don’t think they are a credible threat, and I still think the probability of a nuclear war in Ukraine is very low.
- What are the lessons for those trying to understand the nature of current and future warfare?
Despite the advent of precision weapons, advanced technology, and a whole host of kinetic and non-kinetic tools of warfare, war remains a brutally destructive phenomenon. Shockingly, the United States has lost nearly 7,000 troops and wounded another 50,000 in its 20-year war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
While exact figures are hard to come by, it is estimated that Russia lost nearly 200,000 soldiers (killed or wounded) in just one year of fighting with Ukraine, while the Ukrainian figure is likely to be more than 100,000 casualties .
The great power wars of the 20th century were the most destructive in human history, and no one should have any illusions that great power wars in the 21st century will be different.
