Turkey, above all President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had acted in the past few weeks and months primarily as a mediator in the Ukraine war. The agreement to export grain from Ukraine by ship came about through Turkish mediation. Turkey, a NATO member after all, also mediated a prisoner exchange.
The relationship between Ankara and Moscow is considered difficult, but there is at least a basis for communication between Erdogan and Putin, as was the case recently at the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
Sharp sounds from Ankara
Recently, however, Turkey struck a much sharper tone: the Foreign Ministry in Ankara condemned the announced “referendums” in areas of eastern and southern Ukraine on annexation to Russia as “illegitimate”. These moves to create a “fait accompli” would not be “recognized” by the international community. Turkey had also never recognized Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula, which was also preceded by a “referendum”.
Speaking to the US broadcaster PBS on Monday evening, Erdogan insisted on the return of the areas occupied by Russia to Ukraine – including Crimea. “Of course, if peace is to be established in Ukraine, the return of the occupied land becomes really important. That is expected,” said Erdogan.
India as an economic beneficiary
India, on the other hand, has so far remained neutral in the conflict, meaning it has not criticized Moscow for the war either. To a certain extent, the country is seen as the beneficiary of the economic sanctions against Russia: instead of to Europe, Moscow is now increasingly supplying oil to India – at very reasonable prices. The delivery volume had increased fiftyfold in the summer compared to before the war.
The impression that India is using these economic advantages and is thus standing by Russia’s side has been strengthened in recent months. However, at the SCO meeting in Samarkand, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said now is “not the time for war”.
Slow decoupling of India?
International observers and the media, such as the New York Times and the magazine Foreign Affairs, interpreted this as India’s clear distancing from Russia and at the same time argue that Modi has recently come closer to Europe and the USA with a dense program of visits.
In August, India voted against Russia for the first time on the Ukraine issue and called for an invitation to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to address the UN Security Council by video. In “Foreign Affairs” the Indian political scientist writes of a slow but steady decoupling of India from Russia. Rapid steps are not to be expected, but the subtle gestures are clear.
Call for dialogue from Beijing
In the case of Russia’s even more important ally China, it is also the linguistic nuances that are given a lot of weight – and according to experts, the reaction from Beijing sounded quite distant.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on Russia and Ukraine to start peace talks without preconditions at the UN Security Council. “Dialogue and negotiations” are the only way to end the conflict, Wang said in New York on Thursday. “All efforts that could contribute to solving the crisis should be supported.” Any form of “hot war or new cold war” must be prevented.
called for “restraint”.
Wang demanded that the territorial integrity of all countries must be respected and the principles of the UN Charter must be observed. He called on those involved to “restrain” – but as before did not directly condemn friendly Russia for the war of aggression against Ukraine.
Similarly, the spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, Wang Wenbin, briefly commented on Putin’s new escalation on Thursday. A solution must be found as soon as possible “that takes into account the legitimate security concerns of all parties”. Although China did not abandon its position in the conflict with these words, it nevertheless found quite clear words against an escalation.
Nuclear option as a red line?
Still, the question of how China would respond to Russia’s nuclear threat, or even respond to a nuclear strike, remains difficult to answer. Most Western assessments point in the direction that this is a red line for Beijing, and not just for geostrategic reasons, but also for tangible economic reasons: such an escalation would affect the markets for the Chinese economy. ´
Other analyses, such as one by Archyde.com, assume that Putin’s threats will not change the close relationship between Moscow and Beijing for the time being. In the event of an escalation, however, China will put its own interests first – probably at the price of having to redefine its relationship with Russia.