Turkey has spent three years trying to turn its post–October 7 gains into a new Middle East order — and, a Foreign Affairs analysis concluded, the project is failing.
The verdict is blunt. Turkey’s strategy since Hamas’s 2023 attack on Israel has restored the country’s standing as a regional heavyweight, Foreign Affairs reported, but Ankara cannot impose a security framework on the region any more than its rivals can.
Its newest instrument, the Mecca Defense Alliance signed with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in August, risks doing the opposite of stabilizing it: making countries outside the bloc feel unsafe, and feeding the instability Turkey says it wants to end.
That risk has already left the page. Foreign Affairs reported. The three governments have agreed to prepare forces for rapid deployment — though sending Turkish troops to Saudi Arabia would still require separate parliamentary approval.
“Big, bold, and important,” said President Donald Trump, publicly endorsing the Mecca pact. The endorsement, however, has bought Ankara less than it looks.
The 2013 wager that soured
This is Turkey’s second attempt at regional order-building in fifteen years. When the Arab uprisings swept the region in the early 2010s, the ruling Justice and Development Party framed the upheaval as “the people’s coming to power,” and Ankara expected elections to install governments aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood — ideologically sympathetic, and practically linked, to the AKP.
The bet collapsed. Egypt’s Brotherhood-affiliated president, Mohamed Morsi, was overthrown in 2013, and Turkey’s wager on the Syrian opposition failed as Bashar al-Assad clung to power. Ankara was left isolated.
A rival axis of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE set out to contain it, contesting Turkish positions across the Middle East, North Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Horn of Africa. The contest turned into proxy battles in Libya, Somalia, and Syria.
Assad’s fall, Turkey’s windfall
The attacks of October 7, 2023, opened a second window — and this time one door swung Turkey’s way. In December 2024, opposition groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham toppled Assad, whose survival Ankara had grown so resigned to that it had begun weighing rapprochement with Damascus simply to avoid being left out in the cold. Overnight, Turkey held more influence in Syria than at any point in more than a decade.
Other currents ran against it. Israel’s foreign policy turned more assertive and revisionist after October 7, and its expanding security objectives collided with Turkey’s. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s sharp criticism of Israeli policy in Gaza strained ties; Israel then came to view Ankara’s growing military footprint in post-Assad Syria as a direct threat.
Israel continues to strike sites in Syria — attacks Ankara has condemned — and, Foreign Affairs reported, a miscalculation on either side could produce a direct clash between Israeli and Turkish forces.
The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran cut both ways. Ankara welcomed Tehran’s retreat from Syria and the chance to push back on Iran’s remaining influence in Iraq, and it has no interest in a nuclear-armed Iran.
Three bets, uneven returns
From that maze, Erdogan ran three plays at once: drawing closer to Washington since Trump’s return, pressing regional normalization with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Arab capitals, and launching the “Turkey Without Terror” process to resolve the PKK conflict at home, which adversaries have long exploited by arming or backing Kurdish groups.
The Washington bet paid partially. Turkey was one of four countries the United States brought in to negotiate the October 2025 cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, and Erdogan accepted a seat on Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza’s reconstruction. Turkey also mediated between Washington and Iran during the latest war.
The ceiling showed in February. At a Board of Peace summit that month, Turkey was excluded from the planned international troop deployment and police training in Gaza — proof that warmth with the White House could not override Israeli objections to a Turkish military presence there.
In Syria, likewise, American support has not stopped Israel from striking targets near Turkish positions. Ankara’s clout, Foreign Affairs concluded, is greatest when it stays out of the region’s conflicts.
The Mecca pact’s fine print
Normalization has its own complications.
The deeper problem, Foreign Affairs argued, is structural: no regional power can impose a security order, so every attempt makes its neighbors feel threatened.
Where Ankara actually wins
Turkey’s strongest cards sit closer to home, and they have been quietly paying out. In February 2025, Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, called on the militant group to disarm. In May 2025, the PKK announced it would dissolve — tangible progress in a conflict that has run for decades.
The dividends reach across the border. Kurdish forces are being integrated into the Syrian army, and in August, Mazloum Abdi, commander of the People’s Defense Units, was appointed a presidential adviser in Damascus.
For Ankara, folding Syrian Kurdish fighters into the Syrian state removes the danger it saw in an autonomous, armed Kurdish entity on its southern border — the one piece of the new Middle East Turkey has actually managed to secure.