Ukraine’s BETA-44 Messenger Runs Entirely on Tor With No Central Server

Ukrainian developer Gloria labs has shown a working version of BETA-44, a Windows messenger whose messages, calls and files travel entirely over the anonymous Tor network without ever touching a company server, Mediasat reported.

The design removes the single point of failure that takedowns and mass data leaks depend on. The team, which described the system to the Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi, is now hunting pilot users.

Every BETA-44 user gets their own Tor v3 .onion address, and the app exchanges data with other users directly through it. No central hub exists to block, seize or subpoena.

That is the structural difference from Signal, which routes traffic through its own servers even though end-to-end encryption hides the content from the operator, and from Telegram, which keeps regular chats in its cloud and confines end-to-end encryption to separate secret chats. Mediasat’s report frames the app as an answer to a threat environment that has turned messengers themselves into targets.

Why a serverless messenger matters in wartime

The context is not theoretical. Back in September 2024, Ukraine’s National Cybersecurity Coordination Center moved to limit Telegram on official devices belonging to the military, government agencies and critical infrastructure facilities.

Then in June 2026, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) together with the FBI revealed a large-scale Russian intelligence operation that compromised the messengers used by Ukrainian military personnel, officials and politicians, as Militarnyi reported at the time. And in September 2026, researchers in Vienna found a flaw in Signal that lets attackers pinpoint users’ locations from delivery receipts — a reminder that even server-routed, well-audited encryption leaves metadata exposed.

BETA-44’s answer is to eliminate the relay layer altogether. Data is encrypted end to end with AES-256-GCM, while users agree on keys via X25519. Calls run over Tor too, without the separate STUN/TURN servers that normally set up media connections and relay traffic. Files take the same path and never land in third-party cloud storage.

Beta includes group chat, duress channel

The shipping feature set, per the developers’ description to Militarnyi, covers group chats, a Push-to-Talk mode that turns the app into a walkie-talkie, device-bound accounts, and remote management. If a connection drops, unsent messages stay on the device; once it returns, BETA-44 resumes the transfer and syncs the chat history.

Two features stand out for the threat model they address. One is a duress channel, designed for situations where someone is forced to hand over access to their device or data — the developers envision it letting a user raise an alarm without anyone nearby noticing. The other is a separate offline mode that the team announced but did not explain. How it works is, for now, an open question.

Also unresolved: mobile. The app is Windows-only at this stage, which limits who can test it and how.

How the three architectures compare

Design choice BETA-44 Signal Telegram
Message routing Peer-to-peer over Tor, no company server Through Signal’s own servers Cloud servers for regular chats
End-to-end encryption scope Messages, voice, video, files Messages and calls Separate secret chats only
Media call infrastructure Tor, no STUN/TURN Company infrastructure Company infrastructure

The trade-offs of a serverless design are the mirror image of its strengths. Tor routing means latency and throughput depend on the volunteer relay network, not a well-provisioned data center — a real consideration for voice and video.

And the Vienna researchers’ Signal finding is a useful caution here: removing servers removes one metadata leak, but timing and delivery signals can still betray users on any architecture. BETA-44’s developers have not published an independent audit, and none is cited in the reporting so far.

The dates that got us here

  • September 2024 — Ukraine’s National Cybersecurity Coordination Center restricts Telegram on official military, government and critical-infrastructure devices.
  • June 2026 — the SBU and FBI expose a large-scale Russian campaign hacking Ukrainian officials’ messengers.
  • September 2026 — Vienna researchers disclose a Signal flaw enabling location pinpointing from delivery receipts.

Pilots, not promises

The messenger can already be found on Brave1 Market, the defense tech marketplace run by Ukraine’s Brave1 cluster, and the team has presented it at industry events. The focus now is pilot projects: setting the system up for small groups of users and refining it on their feedback.

“We don’t want people to take our word for it. We want them to test it in action on their own computers,” said Oleksandr Sheichenko, Gloria labs co-founder and CTO.

That invitation doubles as the product’s real test. Serverless architectures live or die on whether independent cryptographers and operators can break them before adversaries do, and no amount of Brave1 Market listing substitutes for that scrutiny. For now, the verifiable facts are the ones the developers demonstrated: a Windows client, Tor v3 addressing, end-to-end encryption across every data type, and no server to seize.

Whether BETA-44 can survive contact with real adversaries — and whether an offline mode the team has not yet explained holds up — is what the pilot projects are meant to find out.

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Technology Desk

Technology Desk at Archyde.

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