Eleven thousand five hundred satellites orbit in the name of one American company — more than every government on Earth combined.
Europe, meanwhile, is planning 348 of its own by 2030. That gap, reported by New Lines, is the transatlantic relationship in miniature: a continent discovering, satellite by satellite and missile by missile, that its security still runs through Washington’s switchboard.
The question now is whether a change of American administration will change any of it. On Oct. 13, Rep. Jim Himes, the soon-to-be chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, stood before an audience at the Warsaw Security Forum and told them what few wanted to hear: don’t count on a return to the old arrangement.
“Superficially, everything is different,” Himes said, according to New Lines. “There will be no threatening of Denmark. There will be no attacking Canada.” But beneath the civility, he warned, the American consensus has shifted.
“The truth is that the American people have realized, and Trump capitalized on this, that we paid a very large cost for the defense umbrella over a generation. And so there will be a continuation on the part of Americans to keep pushing the Europeans to assume more of a role.”
Europeans, by and large, awoke up on Nov. 4 gratified. In a resounding electoral triumph that exceeded even the rosiest forecasts of a midterm backlash against an unpopular lame-duck president, Democrats took control of both the Senate and the House — and at last the ground gave way beneath the MAGA circus.
But Himes’ Warsaw warning lands with force precisely because the past year has shown Europe how fragile its dependence really is — and how expensive the lessons have been.
When the switch gets flipped
The starkest lesson came from the sky. A mere 24 hours after Himes spoke in Warsaw, Ukrainian military officials noticed their Starlink terminals — the connectivity backbone for frontline command and control and counter-drone defense — had been throttled.
The outage, attributed to SpaceX chief executive and onetime de facto DOGE overseer Elon Musk — who poured $445 million into Republican midterm campaigns that largely flopped — ran for 10 days. Germany and Poland are the largest financiers of Starlink in Ukraine.
The consequences were measurable in lives. Over that 10-day stretch, New Lines reported, a far greater number of Russian drones than normal penetrated Ukrainian defenses — among them one that struck a park in Nova Vodolaha, in the Kharkiv region, killing a baby in her stroller along with her mother.
Europe’s answer is IRIS², the EU’s counterpart constellation: 348 satellites by 2030, including a dedicated layer of 66 in low Earth orbit, designed to increase secure governmental communications by 60% within the EU and 54% globally.
The goal is not to compete with Starlink in the commercial space, but to guarantee that “no foreign executive can switch it off, throttle it, or make its continued operation a bargaining chip in someone else’s negotiation,” as EU Insider put it.
Even so, U.S. Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder has warned of “devastating” retaliation if the bloc limits SpaceX’s access to the European mobile satellite band.
On Oct. 22, 48 hours before Starlink’s service returned to normal, Nokia and the Finnish satellite maker ICEYE signed a letter of intent with Ukraine’s Defense Ministry to scale up European alternatives. “But then, the Americans are unhappy again that we’re doing exactly what they wanted us to do and taking our security into our own hands,” Ville Niinistö, a Finnish member of the European Parliament, told New Lines.
The bill for the umbrella
EU defense spending rose roughly 63% from 2020 to 2025, from $257.84 billion to $419.82 billion, with the lion’s share going to equipment and research rather than personnel. Germany, the Netherlands and Poland account for roughly two-thirds of the increase.
| Measure | Figure | Source context |
|---|---|---|
| EU defense spending, 2020 | $257.84 billion | Baseline for the 63% rise |
| EU defense spending, 2025 | $419.82 billion | Germany, Netherlands, Poland drive two-thirds |
| Undelivered U.S. commitments to Ukraine | $16 billion | Zelenskyy, Nov. 5 |
| 500 PAC-3 MSE missiles | $2.1 billion | First shipment not before 2030 |
What the money buys is the problem. The current administration has eliminated nearly all security assistance to Ukraine and delayed transfers pre-authorized by the Biden administration. President Zelenskyy told a Ukrainian broadcaster on Nov. 5 that $16 billion in preexisting American commitments still hadn’t been received.
A consignment of 500 PAC-3 MSE interceptors — the variant used against Russian ballistic missiles — cost $2.1 billion, bought mostly with EU funds, and won’t arrive until 2030 at the earliest. Ukraine’s inventory is nearly exhausted as it faces a punishing winter of strikes.
Burden-sharing, in practice, has become burden transfer: the European allies and Canada now pay the United States for almost all American equipment sent to Ukraine through NATO’s Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List program, then face tariffs on top from the very buyer.
Two wars of words with Moscow
Trump’s energy policy has cut both ways against his own stated aims. He has preached European independence from Russian gas since his first term — urgency sharpened by Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and an EU mandate to phase out Russian liquefied natural gas imports by Jan. 1, 2027, and pipeline gas by Sept. 30, 2027.
Yet in October, citing pump prices, Trump waived sanctions to import Russian diesel into the U.S. after cutting a deal with Vladimir Putin.
His envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are reportedly dangling the reactivation of dormant Russian pipelines through Europe as an incentive for the Kremlin to end the war it started, now in its fifth year — bargaining partly with around $230 billion in EU-frozen Russian assets that Washington does not control.
“If you don’t understand how Russia ripped apart the European security architecture of the last 35 years, you won’t succeed at building a new one,” Michael Carpenter, U.S. ambassador to the Organization for Security and Co-operation from 2021 until 2024, told New Lines, likening the exercise to “trying to operate on a patient without understanding anatomy.” Trump, he added, has little credibility in securing Russian adherence to future agreements.
The Eisenhower plan, 75 years late
The impulse behind European self-reliance is not new. In 1951, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, wrote that if American troops stationed in Europe had not returned home within 10 years, “then this whole project will have failed.” Instead, U.S. troop levels peaked at 475,000 in the late 1950s and stood near 350,000 again in the late 1980s.
“For too long, we loved the status quo arrangement because it allowed us to drink our Aperol spritzes on the beach while America did the dirty work of protecting us from the Russians,” said Teun Janssen, an assistant to Dutch MEP Reinier van Lanschot, in an interview with New Lines. “We got used to it, like an addiction. Now we’re back to first principles, the Eisenhower plan.”
The divide inside Europe, as João Cravinho, the former Portuguese foreign minister, told the magazine, is no longer over the diagnosis but the pace: “The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Scandinavia and the Baltic states now realize that reliance on the United States for our defenses is untenable. That simple sentence would not be at all consensual a few years ago.”
Some want to build autonomous capacity fast; others fear that doing so will only encourage Washington to pull out sooner.
Himes, who has represented Connecticut’s 4th congressional district since 2009, brings an unusually international biography to the intelligence post. Born in Lima, Peru, in 1966 to American parents, he spent his early childhood in Lima and Bogotá, Colombia, before his family settled in New Jersey.
He graduated from Harvard in 1988, where he captained the lightweight crew, and went on to Oxford as a Rhodes scholar, earning a master’s degree in Latin American studies in 1990. Before entering politics, he worked at Goldman Sachs as a banker in Latin America and New York, rising to vice president.
A member of the Intelligence Committee since 2013, he became its ranking member in 2023 and sits in Congress’s “Gang of Eight,” the bipartisan group of senior lawmakers briefed on national security matters.
How NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte handles the relationship, New Lines reported, will be tested when the alliance confronts the next phase of Trump’s plan to end the war through what Kushner calls “an enduring framework for long-term European security and stability.” What it has not yet settled is how fast it needs to.