2023-05-01 21:50:37
South Korean President Yoon and US President Biden
From the White House official site
The U.S.-South Korea summit held on the 26th of last month left a major issue for Japan’s security. President Biden and President Yoon Sung-yeol held a summit meeting and confirmed the strengthening of “extended deterrence” (protecting allies with deterrence, including US nuclear forces).
announced after the meeting“Washington Declaration”“We reconfirmed that we will take an immediate, overwhelming and decisive response to North Korea’s nuclear attack on South Korea. We will mobilize all of our forces, including nuclear weapons, to strengthen extended deterrence.” rice field.
The problem is the specific measures. Take the NHK report as an example.
The two leaders also agreed to establish a new framework for sharing information on nuclear weapons, and to have a US strategic nuclear submarine call in South Korea for the first time since the 1980s during the Cold War era. / While there are voices of doubt about the nuclear deterrence of the United States in some parts of South Korea, it seems that there is also an aim to dispel such anxiety, but strong opposition from the North Korean side is also expected.
The above “strategic nuclear submarine” probably refers to “SSBN”, which the Japanese Ministry of Defense translates as “ballistic missile nuclear submarine” ballistic missile submarine to the ROK”). Ohio-class nuclear submarines are currently in service. A Columbia-class nuclear submarine is planned as its successor.
Indeed, if the “SSBN” calls at the port, “it will be the first time since the 1980s”, but in fact, the same Ohio-class original ship, but the “Michigan”, which was converted into a cruise missile nuclear submarine (SSGN), in April 2017 under the Trump administration. On the 25th, she entered the port of Busan in the south of South Korea. It was widely reported at the time, but for some reason I can’t find any mass media that touched on the achievements this time.
No, there may be an objection that SSGN and SSBN have decisively different military meanings. But the Michigan can carry 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles (the largest number of any surface ship). In addition, it can land members of Navy SEALs and launch remotely piloted unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).
Which one will provoke a “strong reaction from the North Korean side”? I would definitely choose the former Michigan (I hate it). Indeed, the SSBN’s nuclear arsenal is overwhelming. However, there is absolutely no need for the US military to stop by a South Korean port in order to use its “strategic nuclear weapons.” On the contrary, it creates a fatal disadvantage of exposing one’s whereabouts. It is completely incomprehensible to me what kind of military necessity the US-South Korea “SSBN” agreement was born from.
In any case, the South Korean side has since indicated that the “extended deterrence” agreement is “de facto nuclear sharing.” As a matter of course, the US side immediately announced that it was not nuclear sharing. I wrote about the misunderstandings surrounding the so-called “nuclear sharing” in Agora before, so I won’t repeat it (in my book “Lessons of Ukraine”). As the US side denied, the US-South Korea agreement this time is not “nuclear sharing” per se, but it can be described as an agreement on an important pillar that supports NATO’s nuclear deterrence.
One of the pillars of this is the newly established framework for nuclear talks between the United States and South Korea, the NCG. Let’s draw the US-Korea “Washington Declaration”.
The two Presidents announced the establishment of a new Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear and strategic planning, and manage the threat to the nonproliferation regime posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
This must have been with NATO’s nuclear negotiation program “NPG” in mind. Let’s borrow an explanation from Taku Arakaki, Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (“NATO Nuclear Sharing System,” NIDS Commentary No. 211)
In recent years, the third pillar of the NATO nuclear sharing regime, the NPG, has become more important than the DCA (Nuclear Capable Aircraft) mission. The system provides important policy-making and decision-making opportunities for the NATO nuclear deterrence regime, including the sharing of information on nuclear deterrence among almost all member states, the transmission of allied concerns, and the provision of opportunities to discuss the policy on the use of nuclear weapons. It is a place for
An important pillar of this has been newly established between the United States and South Korea, following the example of NATO.
The other is “South Korea’s conventional operational support for US nuclear operations in times of emergency.” For accuracy, let’s quote the original again.
In addition, the Alliance will work to enable joint execution and planning for ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency and improve combined exercises and training activities on the application of nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.
This must also be a strategy modeled after NATO’s SNOWCAT. “SNOWCAT” is an acronym for “Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics”, which literally translates to “Nuclear Operations Support with Conventional (Non-Nuclear) Air Tactics”.
As described above, the US-ROK summit this time has greatly improved nuclear deterrence, following the example of NATO as a nuclear alliance. Japan has been overtaken by South Korea and, so to speak, left behind by the United States and South Korea.
At the U.S.-South Korea summit meeting, an agreement was also reached on the importance of trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and South Korea.
However, the most important thing is the Japanese government, which will aim for “a world without nuclear weapons” at this month’s Hiroshima G7 Summit (see previous post). Is it really okay to stay like this?
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