America Invented the Drone War, So Why Is It Falling Behind?

A former director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency argues the United States is struggling to accept the drone revolution it helped invent — a struggle documented in a series published by The Cipher Brief, authored by VADM Frank Whitworth (Ret.), that contrasts America’s 11,000-drone fleet with Ukraine’s wartime output of 30,000.

The argument, set out in the second installment of Whitworth’s four-part series, is not that Washington ignores novel technology altogether. It is that the Pentagon has institutionalized change on its own terms — creating a Space Force, a space command and a cyber command — while leaving unmanned aircraft far behind, measured in both production and money.

Why point to Brose’s warning?

The intellectual anchor of the piece is Christian Brose’s 2019 essay “The New Revolution in Military Affairs: War’s Sci-Fi Future” in Foreign Affairs, which Whitworth treats as the mainstream document that called the problem first.

Brose wrote five years before the series that “artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, ubiquitous sensors, advanced manufacturing, and quantum science will transform warfare” as radically as earlier military-technical revolutions, “and yet the U.S. government’s thinking about how to employ these new technologies is not keeping pace with their development,” The Cipher Brief reported.

America Invented the Drone War, So Why Is It Falling Behind?
Photo: foxtonnews.com

Brose also traced what the series calls a history of “change labels” without substantive adjustment to core military methods. The sequence runs from the “military technical revolution” of 1992, through Admiral Arthur Cebrowski’s “Network-Centric Warfare” in the mid-1990s, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “transformation” in the 9/11 era, to Deputy Secretary Robert Work’s “third offset strategy” in 2014.

Each offered a new name for one idea, as the series quotes Brose: emerging technologies would let sensor-and-shooter battle networks “rapidly accelerate the process of detecting, targeting, and striking threats.”

His criticism of procurement followed the same line: Washington, he wrote, “poured money into newer versions of old military platforms and prayed for technological miracles to come (which often became acquisition debacles when those miracles did not materialize).” Whitworth credits Brose with having seen, well before the Pentagon’s Replicator program for autonomous vehicles existed, the need for fleets of drones with ubiquitous communications and autonomy.

How far behind Ukraine is the Pentagon?

The series measures reluctance in one number: output. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced in December 2024 that Ukraine would produce 30,000 medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) drones the following year — nearly tripling the U.S. Defense Department’s entire drone fleet of 11,000, a figure that includes small, hand-launched aircraft such as the RQ-11B Raven.

Ukraine, in The Cipher Brief’s framing, “lapped” American military drone production in two years despite America’s 20-year head start.

Measure Ukraine United States
MALE drone production target (announced Dec. 2024) 30,000 —
DOD total drone fleet — 11,000
Domestic drone manufacturers 200 73 firms (per IBISWorld)

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Transformation, cited by the series, reports seven domestic drone models produced in 2022 — a count that grew tenfold to 67 within two years, alongside some 200 domestic manufacturers. The American industrial picture runs the other way.

IBISWorld, per the series, estimates only 73 businesses remain in the U.S. UAV manufacturing sector, shrinking at a compound annual rate of 5.8 percent to $4.0 billion through 2024 — a 21.4 percent drop in 2024 alone — after the Afghanistan withdrawal and reduced military contracts.

What do the budgets say?

The money follows the same pattern, the series argues, citing the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)’s April 4, 2024 report, “Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, FY2025.” Unmanned aircraft systems account for less than four percent of Defense Department spending on aviation and related systems.

There are no unmanned line items at all in the proposed $48 billion for shipbuilding and maritime systems, nor in the proposed $13 billion for ground systems. The Navy leads the services in research and development for unmanned systems, the series concedes, but those investments will take time to appear in the fleet.

Where does the reluctance argument stop?

Whitworth is careful, The Cipher Brief notes, to limit the claim. His application of the framework developed by Marshall — the principles carried through the series — treats the space and cyber domains as areas where the United States has accepted non-proximate warfare, pointing to the creation of the United States Space Force, U.S. Space Command and U.S. Cyber Command.

Drones are the exception the series sets out to prove, through the Ukraine comparison and the budget split.

The series continues this week, drawn from a December 2024 white paper; the outlet cautions that dates, figures and forecasts reflect that original context. Part Three, readers are told, focuses on identifying and testing the reluctance itself — with The Cipher Brief publishing all four parts exclusively through the week and the views attributed to the author alone, not the Department of War or the Department of the Navy.

Omar El Sayed — World Editor

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