Brazil’s Ministry of Finance handed lawmakers a technical note this month claiming its digital markets bill, PL 4675/2025, would deliver R$ 15.3 billion to R$ 50.6 billion a year in economic benefits — as much as R$ 240 per inhabitant.
Rerun with the Ministry’s own alternative inputs, the range collapses to roughly R$ 5 billion to R$ 15 billion, before counting any costs. That is the core finding of an analysis published by CCIA, the trade association, which argues Congress should not rush the bill under an urgency procedure on such fragile arithmetic.
Here is why that matters beyond Brasília. The bill is Brazil’s answer to the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, and Brussels is watching how the DMA-inspired framework travels.
The stakes are not abstract. Foreign investors in Brazilian cloud, advertising, and app distribution — much of it supplied by American, Chinese, and European firms — would operate under obligations imposed by CADE, the competition authority, on a case-by-case basis.
What the technical note describes as a transfer of surplus from platforms to users, economists generally do not score as a net benefit at all: what one side gains, the other loses. Any genuine net gain would come from efficiency effects the note says it did not estimate.
A model copied from cartel cases
How did the Ministry build its headline number? The method is simple to the point of fragility. The note applies a price reduction ranging from 10% to 33% — a spread the note itself labels merely illustrative — to projected 2025 revenue of R$ 153.3 billion spread over 13 digital segments. That is the whole model, CCIA reported.
The 33% ceiling comes from the mean overcharge in a survey of price-fixing cartels, even though the note insists it accuses no platform of unlawful conduct. That mean is pulled upward by outliers.
Swap in the same survey’s median and the top of the range drops to R$ 28.7 billion. A peer-reviewed reanalysis correcting earlier cartel data for bias puts the typical overcharge near 16% — about a third of the 49% figure the Ministry used.
The 10% floor has its own problem. The merger study the note cites finds a mean price increase of about 7%, which the annex converts to a 6.6% cut worth R$ 10.2 billion. The Ministry published 10% anyway, relying on nominal app-store commission cuts. And the headline contradicts the note’s own Table 3, which reserves cuts above 25% for markets that have already tipped toward monopoly and caps still-forming markets at 20%.
One table, two very different estimates
The gap between the headline and the Ministry’s own alternatives is the story. Set side by side, the figures read like two different bills.
| Parameter | Headline estimate | Ministry’s own alternative |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue base (2025, 13 segments) | R$ 153.3 billion | R$ 80.4 billion |
| Price cut applied | 10% to 33% | 6.6% to 18.7% |
| Annual benefit range | R$ 15.3–50.6 billion | R$ 5.3–15.0 billion |
| Quantified costs of the bill | None | None |
The lower revenue base is not a rival analyst’s invention — the Ministry’s annex quietly lays the groundwork for it. Cloud, the biggest entry at R$ 66.3 billion, lumps subscription software together with infrastructure; once the software is removed, the cloud line contracts to somewhere between R$ 15.1 billion and R$ 27.4 billion.
The ride-hailing figure may be total fares rather than platform revenue, pointing closer to R$ 3.7 billion than R$ 14.95 billion. The mobile operating system line is an assumed 10% of iPhone sales — a price no one directly pays.
The only evidence is a nominal price cut
But there is a catch with the sole platform-specific evidence too. The note rests on three app-store episodes — South Korea, the Netherlands, and the European Union — where headline commissions on some payments fell from 30% to between 20% and 27%.
The annex admits these are nominal cuts that ignore what developers actually pay new payment processors and how many developers switched. App stores are under 5% of the Ministry’s revenue base. Advertising alone is nearly a quarter of it, and it funds services users receive for free.
Costs enter nowhere in the arithmetic
The note prices benefits to the decimal and quantifies no costs at all. Its own annex borrows a single compliance-cost figure and concedes that dynamic costs — delayed product launches, the issue that has defined Europe’s DMA experience — went unquantified.
That same study estimates the consumer welfare loss from a one-year product delay at R$ 8.7 billion in present value over ten years. Europe’s experience shows the cost is real: as Apple has pointed to the Digital Markets Act, it has held back features such as iPhone Mirroring and Live Translation for users in the EU.
The counterfactual is missing as well. CADE opened an inquiry into cloud licensing practices in January 2026 under existing law. Food delivery saw two heavily funded competitors enter the market in 2025, and in response the leading player has since unveiled an investment plan worth R$ 24 billion. Competition is already moving — without the bill.
Even the Ministry’s chosen yardstick cuts against it. The annex notes the European Commission projected consumer gains of about 0.09% of GDP from the DMA. Brazil’s headline claims 0.12% to 0.40% — more than four times the Brussels figure at the top end.
What lawmakers should demand first
CCIA contends that before casting their votes, lawmakers should require the Ministry to supply four items: segment-by-segment proof of market power and overcharges; price impacts tailored to the business models that would actually fall under the rules; a complete tally of costs, covering services that are postponed, diminished, or pulled altogether; and projections of how the bill would affect investment in Brazil over the medium term.
The technical note and its methodological annex remain published on the Ministry’s site, alongside its press release on the R$ 15 billion-plus claim. Brazilian consumers deserve low prices, good services, and policy built on evidence — and an estimate that loses about two-thirds of its value under the Ministry’s own alternative assumptions, while failing to quantify any costs, is no basis for rewriting Brazil’s competition law.