A year and a half after arguing that China’s strongest play in a Taiwan war might be keeping the United States out of the fight altogether, Joel Wuthnow says the record since then points the same way.
In a follow-up interview published by War on the Rocks, the researcher revisits his 2025 article, “How China Could Counter U.S. Intervention in War Over Taiwan,” and finds Beijing still building the tools to threaten the American homeland rather than merely striking U.S. forces in the region first.
The verdict matters because most public debate about a Taiwan conflict centers on whether China would open fire on U.S. bases and ships. Wuthnow’s argument, as he restated it to War on the Rocks, is that Beijing’s most attractive option may be deterring Washington from intervening at all — by making any American entry into the war look like a gamble with the U.S. homeland.
The evidence he cites comes largely from the Pentagon’s own annual assessment. According to the Department of Defense’s 2025 report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, China has been fielding the long-range DF-27 conventional missile, moving toward a launch-on-warning nuclear posture, and expanding silo fields in western China. In Wuthnow’s reading, expanding and diversifying these strategic capabilities could let Beijing conduct nuclear signaling during a crisis and raise the perceived risks of any U.S. intervention triggering inadvertent escalation with a nuclear-armed rival.
Beijing has also put its newest systems on public display. At the September 2025 military parade in Beijing, China showcased the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile, and the DF-61 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile.
Taken together, these systems represented the legs of a new triad focused on Washington — a pointed message about where China’s deterrent is aimed.
The signaling has continued beyond the parade ground. Wuthnow pointed to a test-launch of an intercontinental-range submarine-launched missile in July 2026, as well as a growing number of joint bomber patrols with Russia, as further displays intended, in his estimation, to undermine U.S. confidence in regional intervention.
The pattern tracks with the core claim of the 2025 article: that the question worth asking is not only how China would fight U.S. forces, but how it would convince Washington to stay out. Each of the developments Wuthnow lists — the DF-27, the launch-on-warning shift, the silo expansion, the new triad — raises the cost calculus for a president weighing whether to commit the U.S. homeland to the defense of Taiwan.
What the public record does not yet show is how far that thinking has been absorbed into Chinese operational planning. Wuthnow’s assessment rests on what is publicly available — the Pentagon report, the parade, the test-launch, the patrols — and he frames his conclusions in those terms rather than claiming sight of classified Chinese doctrine.
Readers looking for the rest of his answer will find it behind a paywall. War on the Rocks has reserved the full interview for its members, with the published excerpt cutting off mid-sentence at the point where Wuthnow begins to detail the most notable part of the signaling he has observed since 2025.