Russia’s spy network in Europe has grown since 2022, and Latvian security analysts warn that sabotage campaigns targeting infrastructure and defense industry are intensifying — even though a direct Russian attack on NATO valstīm is not expected in 2026.
Toms Rostoks, politologs un drošības politikas pētnieks, Latvijas Universitātes asociētais profesors, laid out the assessment in an interview, according to NRA.
Rostoks told nra.lv the risk of active military confrontation remains low — but that Russia’s quieter campaign is not.
“Riski, ka militārā konfrontācija varētu aktīvi notikt, nav pārāk lieli,” Rostoks said. “Tos varam vērot jau vairāk nekā četrarpus gadus. Ja vienai vai otrai pusei būtu bijusi vēlme eskalēt konfliktu, tas jau būtu noticis.”
Sabotage as Russia’s chosen weapon
Rostoks described a pattern of attacks on critical infrastructure and Europe’s military-industrial base, assassinations of people inconvenient to Moscow, and provocations along NATO’s eastern flank. Their intensity, he said, is rising — and so is the chance that someone in Europe dies as a result.
“Krievija šobrīd cenšas palielināt drošības riskus Eiropas valstīs, lai tās saprastu, ka atbalsts Ukrainai var radīt konkrētas neērtības,” Rostoks told nra.lv.
The methods vary: arson, lethal attacks, and similar operations. In many cases, he said, Russia’s hand is visible. But he cautioned against reflexive blame.
Much of the work, Rostoks explained, is outsourced. Russian intelligence services use social media to recruit citizens of third countries — people in financial difficulty willing to set fires, damage infrastructure or surveil critical sites for small payments. The arrangement is convenient and cheap, and it lets Moscow deny involvement.
Ukrainians living in Europe have become a particular target, he said. By recruiting Ukrainians for sabotage, Russia aims to turn European public opinion against Kyiv. And Latvians themselves are exposed: citizens who travel regularly to Russia or Belarus to visit relatives face a real risk of recruitment — or of pressure from Russian law enforcement, which can be used against them.
The 1997 map Moscow wants back
When Russian officials talk about a new European security architecture, Rostoks said, they mean something specific: a return to the borders of 1997, before several countries joined the alliance. Russian proposals have even floated Finland’s exit from NATO — ideas ģeopolitikas analītiķi have called neīstenojamiem.
The logic, as Rostoks reconstructed it, runs like this: Russia’s protests against NATO enlargement were ignored, so a stable security environment requires taking Russian interests into account and meeting Russian demands. Only then, Moscow argues, would peace come to Europe — with a buffer of militarily weak states between Russia and the alliance, and no NATO presence in the Baltic states.
NATO’s position is the opposite: that peace rests on alliance strength and forward presence in the Baltics as a deterrent against Russian attack. The two visions are irreconcilable, and Rostoks did not pretend otherwise.
| Year | Event | Relevance to the current standoff |
|---|---|---|
| 1997 | NATO–Russia Founding Act signed | The baseline year Russia cites when demanding a new European security order |
| 2022 | Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine | Start of the current confrontation and the expansion of Russian spy networks in Europe |
The ideology behind the war
Rostoks reserved some of his sharpest words for Aleksandr Dugins, the “krievu pasaules” ideologs, who has argued that Russia loves and respects Ukrainians but kills them in the name of a very important goal.
“Tas, ko viņš un viņam līdzīgi domājošie raksta un runā, ir visnotaļ kritiski vērtējams,” Rostoks said. “Tur ir ideoloģija, nevis analīze. Ja cilvēka nogalināšana tiek attaisnota, vairāk jautājumu nav.”
The professor said that Russia’s domestic political calculus drives much of the external campaign: Moscow needs to show its own society that Europe’s support for Ukraine does not go unpunished. Sabotage abroad serves that narrative at home.
For now, Rostoks concluded, the arithmetic holds: as long as the war continues and Europe keeps supporting Ukraine, it must reckon with Russia’s reaction — and the spy network across the continent keeps growing.
— Toms Rostoks, politologs un drošības politikas pētnieks, Latvijas Universitātes asociētais profesors
Rostoks is also Director of the Center for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy of Latvia, and holds a doctorate in political science.
His research has covered NATO’s deterrence measures in the Baltic region, changes in Latvia’s security policy since 2014, and public opinion on national defense. As he has noted, Latvia’s position as one of the countries bordering Russia means its researchers receive special attention from the international scientific community.
Rostoks’ warning stands alongside them: a direct Russian attack on NATO is not expected in 2026, but the intensity of deniable attacks such as sabotage is increasing, as is the likelihood that they will demand human lives in Europe.