Latvia’s defense plan in case of attack by Russia and Belarus revealed

Three years before large-scale war

“In responding to changing security challenges, the Latvian state defense system needs to be comprehensive and needs to be based on the readiness of the entire society and state institutions to overcome the crisis, as well as resilience against external influence,” postulates the Ministry of Defense. “The private sector, non-governmental organizations and residents also need to get involved.” Military and civilian personnel should “evaluate Ukraine’s experience with the Russian invasion in order to timely assess the necessary resources and actions in various crisis situations.”

As always at the beginning of official documents, the background to the issue is given, and here a feeling of shock arises. It turns out that Cabinet of Ministers Order No. 155 “On the working group for coordinating issues of comprehensive state defense” was adopted on April 4, 2019. Such was the power of foresight of national politicians – what did they know?

In any case, they could not foresee that a year later they would have to face an unprecedented misfortune in the form of covid and that the state would fail this exam. First of all, the Ministry of Defense. After all, the military department under the leadership of Artis Pabriks took over the procurement of protective masks and other equipment during the time of Covid – and as a result, murky schemes were revealed, as a result of which the parties “For Development/For!” denied the confidence of the national voter. Despite the strong support of Ukraine…

Who will climb Pilskalns?

Under the code name “Pilskalns,” the Ministry of Defense conducted a series of 14 exercises for municipal leadership in 2023. “It is necessary to establish a response plan to provide society with basic needs in the event of a military conflict,” the Ministry of Defense indicated.

The maneuvers were carried out from Valka to Jekabpils and from Adazi to Rezekne, all on the right bank of the Daugava. As for Kurzeme and Zemgale, this unit took part in the war game “Nameis”. The exercises will continue in 2024. About 50 enterprises and institutions of category D are involved in their implementation: “critical infrastructure carries out planning to ensure continuous operations in various crisis circumstances.”

Under the code name “Mouthpiece” the Landlords organized seminars on communication in the event of a military threat. Representatives of the National Armed Forces told civilians about hybrid warfare, communication and working with target audiences.

Under the motto “How do we protect Latvia?” The Ministry of Defense is holding lectures in 200 schools during the 2023/24 academic year. Another 182 educational institutions introduced the subject of national defense this year. 8.5 thousand young men and women joined the Jaunsargov movement. Young militiamen should be inspired by a visual exhibit that was dragged across Latvia – from Bauska to Smiltene – a Russian T-72B tank destroyed by Ukrainians.

As part of the NATO exercise CMX23, in turn, in Latvia, “a complex civil-military scenario was simulated.” The Alliance chose Riga to host the Resilience in an Age of Disruption symposium, where 250 politicians, bureaucrats and experts considered how best to “resist, respond and bounce back.”

This means a greater military presence of NATO allies in Latvia

Such a situation, according to the Ministry of Defense, would mean the presence in the country of “pre-positioned equipment and material reserves, as well as regular military exercises in the region, thereby improving mutual compatibility, developing capabilities and raising readiness to respond immediately to a crisis.”

It cannot be said that the country’s population is very concerned about the crisis. In 2023, according to the Sargs.lv portal, the “72 hours” section, which talks about preparing households for emergencies, was studied by only 19,014 users, i.e. about 1% of the Latvian population.

Last year was also a landmark year for the restored army conscription, or, as it is officially called, the State Defense Service. At the first stage, 488 citizens volunteered as volunteers in 2023, of whom, after health checks and everything else, only 253 were found fit, i.e., a little more than half. “So far, volunteers have assessed the experience positively – both assessing the quality of the training program and the infrastructure offered to the service,” the Ministry of Defense states.

The second set of applicants turned out to be less numerous – 236, 130 met the criteria. They were distributed to the Headquarters Battalion in Riga, the Air Defense Division in Lielvarde and the 25th Combat Support Battalion of the National Guard in Stamerien.

The third set identified 515 volunteers, of whom 330 citizens were identified as suitable for service. Due to the fact that the NAF needed 480 recruits, for the first time a conscription was carried out on the principle of random (computer) sampling, which is why 300 citizens were selected. Of these, about half again did not meet health indicators…

More technology, good and different

The document presented to the government and society also talks about equipping the NAF. Latvia’s “layered” air defense, according to Minister Spruds’ document, will include MRAD and IRIS-T missiles. Ground forces will receive HIMARS rocket artillery. The naval forces will be armed with NSM anti-ship missiles. Supply agreements have already been signed.

The army will continue to be equipped with armored vehicles and drones. All this “will provide the necessary firepower, protection and distance.”

The latter is especially important – after all, unlike Ukraine, Latvia does not have the strategic depth that is so important in a conventional conflict. Although, geographically, our country is located significantly more advantageously than neighboring Lithuania. The latter, firstly, is sandwiched between two groups of a potential enemy located in the Kaliningrad region and Belarus – and on the other hand, the capital Vilnius is located in a straight line at a distance of 35 km from the Belarusian border.

Accordingly, the distance to the EU and NATO borders for Riga is 250 km, and for Tallinn – 210 km. Estonian neighbors also have an established sea crossing with their allied Finland.

In any case, the military department points out, “the defense of Latvia and the protection of independence is a joint responsibility of society.” Your author also hopes that the above arguments will serve the stated goal of the Ministry of Defense – “to find answers to questions about the comprehensive defense of the state and security challenges to Latvia.”