Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has won a fourth term as Brazil’s president, but he takes office on January 5, 2027 without a congressional majority after the far-right Liberal Party outpolled his Workers’ Party in legislative elections. His defeated rival Flávio Bolsonaro has fled to Florida, and a divided Congress will test Lula’s celebrated skills as a negotiator.
Lula beat a Bolsonaro again — this time Jair’s son Flávio — but the victory came at a cost. As The Progressive reported, the Liberal Party won nineteen of the fifty-four Senate seats up for election, making it the chamber’s largest voting bloc at 35 percent heading into the 2027 legislative session. Lula, meanwhile, won by a narrow margin and will govern without a legislative majority.
Why should the rest of the world care? Because Brazil is the steward of the Amazon rainforest and a country that emphasizes its position on the international stage. How Lula manages a hostile Congress will shape commodity markets, climate diplomacy, and whether the democratic playbook that held in Brasília can hold anywhere else.
Flávio Bolsonaro’s Flight to Florida
The defeated candidate did not stay for the count’s aftermath. On October 28, Flávio Bolsonaro and his family arrived in Florida on a small chartered flight, joining his brother Eduardo, who relocated to Texas in 2025 while facing Brazilian criminal charges.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has denied that the Trump Administration assisted the escape — but as The Progressive reported, the family received express visas issued the day before they fled.

Brazilian voters noticed. A poll cited by the Brazilian outlet Globo found 62 percent of respondents believed Bolsonaro acted inappropriately by leaving the country after unconvincingly declaring himself “Brazil’s true president-elect.”
Juan Agulló, a professor at the Latin American Institute of Economy, Society, and Politics at UNILA and member of the Directive Committee of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences, told The Progressive that Brazilians viewed the escape negatively. He added that this sentiment included the more moderate segments of the right.
Flávio’s legal exposure is real. Active investigations are probing defamation, alleged money laundering, corruption, and unlawful financing of films and campaigns, and he violated a judge’s order to surrender his passports shortly after the election. His father sits in prison for his role in the January 8, 2023 coup attempt. Eduardo faces charges should he return.
Bolsonaro's own party wants nothing to do with him. Ana Tereza Duarte, a political scientist and business professor at the Faculdade Central do Recife, described the scene to The Progressive.
“Flavio challenged the election results, and his party’s leadership is now attempting to distance itself from the Bolsonaro family,” Duarte said. “The president of his party, the Liberal Party, Valdemar Costa Neto, claimed to have no knowledge of Flavio’s escape plan and is currently reorganizing the party with an eye toward the future. All of this is happening without any mention of Flavio.”
How “Lula’s Army” Beat the Algorithm
Lula was in a troubling place after the first round on October 4. Congressman André Janones, himself a figure with a broad online following, stepped in to build a WhatsApp channel that grew to 10.8 million followers within days. The group, dubbing itself “Lula’s Army,” posted daily campaigns teaching followers to produce viral content, combat disinformation, and disengage from hostile replies so as not to amplify the opponent’s message.
Juan Agulló told The Progressive that the phenomenon was truly impressive, describing it as an incredible, absolutely incredible phenomenon that was almost beyond belief.
It was not only digital warfare. Activists flagged police checkpoints on election day — a tactic mayors have used for decades to suppress the vote in a country where voting is compulsory. A Brazilian court ordered Meta to guarantee equal treatment of the candidates and fined the company for each day of noncompliance, after allegations that its platforms favored the Bolsonaro campaign.
Harvard’s David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (DRCLAS) adds a crucial nuance: political scientists at its Tuesday Seminar said that Lula’s comeback relied less on elite endorsements than on ground-up organizing, and that the second round effectively became a referendum on the Bolsonaro family’s return — not a broad endorsement of Lula’s record.
Nara Pavão, associate professor of political science at the Federal University of Pernambuco, observed that voters’ assessments of the national economy were more negative than their own household finances, a reminder that political identity shapes economic perception.
A Congress Lula Cannot Command
So what can a fourth-term Lula actually deliver? The constraint is arithmetic. The Progressive reported that Brazil’s legislature has historically leaned right, which is why Brazilian administrations have always governed through coalitions with centrist parties — and, as Duarte told the magazine, “there is no monolithic opposition majority either.”
DRCLAS’s seminar flagged a second, harder constraint: money. Fernando Limongi, professor at the University of São Paulo and Fundação Getúlio Vargas, argued that a stronger right in Congress does not make coalition-building impossible — Brazil’s parties still have incentives to negotiate — but that the budget is largely committed to existing obligations. His blunt assessment: “The problem is that there is no money.”
Agulló expects Lula to lean on what he knows best: bargaining. “Lula is very skillful, if there’s one thing he knows how to do, it’s that: navigating and negotiating within that political system,” he told The Progressive. “He has been active in this political system for the last fifty years.”
The agenda, Agulló says, will likely center on a progressive approach to urban crime, a regional coalition to protect the Amazon rainforest, and a louder Brazilian voice on the world stage.
| Brazil’s political landscape after the 2026 election | Detail |
|---|---|
| Liberal Party share of the Senate for the 2027 session | 35% |
| “Lula’s Army” WhatsApp followers at peak | 10.8 million |
| Brazilians who viewed Flávio Bolsonaro’s flight as inappropriate (Globo poll) | 62% |
| Lula’s inauguration date for his fourth term | January 5, 2027 |
Why a Repeat of January 8 Looks Unlikely
The memory of 2023 hangs over everything. The last time Lula beat a Bolsonaro, in 2022, the far right answered with a January 8, 2023 riot that echoed the January 6, 2021 insurrection in Washington. This time, both Duarte and Agulló believe a repeat is improbable.
“That became highly discredited in the eyes of the Brazilian public, and the justice system itself was very harsh, too,” Agulló says. “It really happened at every level, from Bolsonaro himself down to ordinary, everyday people who took part in the assault on the institutions. Some of them are even in prison now. There’s a mix of fear . . . I think that acts as a bit of a deterrent.”
— Juan Agulló, told The Progressive
But there is a longer shadow. David J. Samuels, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, told the DRCLAS seminar, “I don’t think polarization is going anywhere,” arguing that support for and opposition to the Workers’ Party reflect deeper disagreements over social change that will outlast both Lula and the Bolsonaros.
The Date That Starts Everything
Mark January 5, 2027. That is when Lula takes the oath for a fourth term, and the first coalition negotiations will signal whether his fifty years of political craft can bend a right-leaning Congress toward an ambitious agenda. Watch the centrist blocs, the fiscal arithmetic, and the Amazon file — those three will tell you more about Brazil’s next four years, and about the global stakes, than any single headline.