On November 18, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen to pledge the construction of a fairer multipolar world order.
During the gathering, Xi spoke of the democratisation of international relations, while Putin condemned tariffs, export controls and sanctions as instruments of coercion, Eurasia Review reported. The discussions preceded the first trilateral encounter involving the Chinese, Russian and American presidents, bringing structural realities of international politics into sharp focus.
The rhetoric deployed in Shenzhen merges two distinct concepts: multipolarity, which describes the distribution of power among states, and multilateralism, which concerns how that power is exercised and whether smaller nations retain a voice.
Structural realists define polarity strictly as an empirical count of states with significant capabilities, carrying no inherent normative content. Multilateralism requires the coordination of relations based on generalised principles of conduct that apply regardless of the strategic exigencies of individual parties.
Major Powers Violate Sovereign Equality Principle
Any claim to a fair international order must be measured against the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. Yet major powers have repeatedly bypassed these standards when national interests demanded it. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 violated the territorial integrity of a state given security assurances under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
China rejected the July 2016 arbitral ruling in Philippines v. China, which found no legal basis for Beijing’s expansive South China Sea claims. Meanwhile, the United States maintains a long record of regional primacy, from the Monroe Doctrine to the 2003 invasion of Iraq without Security Council authorisation, alongside its modern deployment of unilateral tariffs and sanctions.
Each of these nations has claimed special prerogatives that are routinely denied to smaller states, a dynamic scholar Stephen D. Krasner termed “organised hypocrisy.” When superpowers invoke sovereignty norms rhetorically while setting them aside when power permits, declarations about fairness function primarily as assertions of their own geopolitical standing.
Comparisons to the Yalta Conference of 1945 remain tempting, but analysts note that Shenzhen lacks an equivalent formal bargain partitioning territories behind the backs of those affected. The reported agenda focuses on nuclear non-proliferation, Iran and Ukraine, and open channels of communication among nuclear-armed states remain vital public goods.
The central risk is procedural rather than conspiratorial: a great-power concert becomes illegitimate precisely when its deliberations extend to third parties—such as Taiwan, Ukraine, or regional maritime orders—while the affected countries are reduced to mere objects of discussion.
Great-Power Concert Threatens Developing Nations' Policy Space
Developing nations have long relied on a competitive international environment to secure policy space, hedging between alternative suppliers of infrastructure finance, technology and security cooperation. A great-power concert, even an informal one, directly threatens to reduce this competition dividend. Exchanging total dependence on a single superpower for subordination to a triad of powers offers no genuine autonomy.
Addressing these structural imbalances requires substantive institutional reform rather than a mere multiplication of hegemonic centers. Such changes include restructuring the United Nations Security Council to eliminate or dilute veto privileges, adjusting voting power within international financial institutions, and establishing formal mechanisms for affected states to shape the legal limits of sanctions and export controls.
Regional bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the African Union remain critical aggregators for the voice of smaller states.
Ultimately, the legitimacy of any global order rests on whether nations like Bangladesh, Bolivia, Kenya or Vietnam can make autonomous economic and security choices without facing coercion from Washington, Beijing or Moscow. Until smaller states secure a binding role in rule-making, a multipolar world will simply function as a world with multiple hegemons.
Stephen D. Krasner, a professor of international relations at Stanford University, introduced the concept of “organised hypocrisy” in his 1999 book *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, published by Princeton University Press. The work argues that states have historically honored international legal sovereignty while treating Westphalian sovereignty — the right to exclude external authority — as provisional, violating norms when power or interest dictated.
Omar El Sayed – World Editor