Russian FSB-linked spies hacked one US organization, stole its employee roster, then posed as its staff to break into a second US organization months later — a chain Help Net Security reported on, drawing on findings from Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG).
Google tracks the group as COLD RELIC — also known as Star Blizzard, Callisto and Gossamer Bear — and assesses it has been active for over a decade. The US has formally associated it with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB).
Its targets are government officials, defense contractors and NGOs across Europe and North America, and The Hacker News carried Google’s description of the group’s success at compromising high-value targets while maintaining a consistent operational tempo.
“Once COLD RELIC compromises a target, it uses stolen emails and data to establish authentic pretexts and impersonate contacts when reaching out to subsequent targets,” Google researchers wrote.

The first intrusion began in late 2025 with stolen credentials for a Super Admin account at an unspecified US organization. The attackers logged in through a residential proxy network located close to the victim, so the sign-ins would not trigger impossible-travel alerts, and kept sending MFA push requests until the account holder approved one — a fatigue technique that let them register their own device to the tenant.
With admin rights in hand, they downloaded the entire cloud storage drive, both by mass-sharing files to a COLD RELIC-operated email account and by direct download, exported full employee lists, and launched a domain-wide data export through Google Workspace Takeout. They queried audit logs to check defenders’ visibility and “viewed, modified, and deleted Alert Center notifications to remove forensic evidence of the initial intrusion.”
To keep hold of the environment for several months, they enrolled passkeys, MFA backup codes and rogue MFA devices of their own. Passwords some employees had stored in the company’s cloud storage let the attackers open other accounts, including personal ones typically unmonitored by employers.
In 2026, someone posing as an employee of the first victim contacted a person at a second US organization over an encrypted messaging app and, partway through the conversation, shared phishing links.
“These phishing links, designed to steal credentials and authentication tokens for Entra ID, redirected the victim to document lures relevant to the ongoing conversation in order to avoid raising suspicion,” the researchers explained. Once authenticated with the stolen credentials, the group registered a new MFA device in the second organization’s SSO solution and kept access throughout the intrusion.
The two cases are tied together by the group’s own infrastructure: COLD RELIC routes phishing traffic through compromised websites that vet visitors, often attaching a link parameter naming a previous victim or lure.
A redirector URL from the second intrusion, submitted to VirusTotal in June 2026, carried a parameter referencing the first victim organization. After the chat ended, the attacker changed the messaging app profile name “to a completely new person.”
Even after being expelled from the first victim, the group kept phishing colleagues and professional associates using accounts impersonating its employees. “By obtaining access to strategic personnel rosters and operational documents, Russian intelligence services turn legitimate business communications into attack vectors against trusted partners,” Google said.