The Man from Tripoli: A Former French Spy’s Memoirs on Libya and the Fall of Gaddafi

2023-06-01 14:48:15

For twenty-five years, Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-François Lhuillier was an agent of the General Directorate of External Security (DGSE), the French secret service. A career choice assumed by this career soldier trained at the 1st RPIMa in Bayonne, a traditional breeding ground for the French services.

In the book he just published – The man from Tripoli. Secret Agent Memoirs* –, the former spy goes into detail about what he calls “one of the most significant episodes of [son] course”, which was also one of the last: his assignment in Libya, from July 2009 to March 2012, when the Westerners, France in the lead, having decided to let him go, the regime of Muammar Gaddafi collapsed .

In Tripoli, Jean-François Lhuillier was in a paradoxical position since he was a sort of “official” spy, clearly identified as such with the authorities, who knowingly used him to transmit messages to Paris, sometimes preferring to address to the representative of “the box”, that is to say of the DGSE, than to Ambassador François Gouyette.

The soldier’s job was to maintain useful contacts in the country, which led him to frequent high-ranking officers, such as General Salem Kerba, responsible for the relations of the Libyan services with their foreign counterparts, but also and above all Abdallah Senoussi, unofficial number two in the regime and brother-in-law of Muammar Gaddafi. Now retired, the former agent sheds light on the events of 2011 that helps to better understand the chaos in which, twelve years later, Libya and some of the countries surrounding it remain immersed.

To read

Libya: Gaddafi, the tragic death of the “Guide”

Jeune Afrique: In the epilogue to your book, you mention the “sad toll” of Western interventions in Libya, a country “ransacked” when it was a “bulwark against Islamism”… For you, it’s a complete failure?

Jean Francois Lhuillier: To have brought down Gaddafi at this time, for me it remains incomprehensible. I still don’t see the point, when he was taking a step towards the West, making amends, promising to get rid of his weapons of mass destruction… And the country was a bulwark against Islamism, already very threatening at the time.

Libyan officials at the time, led by Abdallah Senoussi, warned that if they fell, Europe would find itself with “an Islamic emirate” a few hours by boat from its shores. Looking back, what do you think?

Of course, Libyan officials exaggerated the threat a bit, but ultimately not that much. Moreover, in June 2009, the DGSE had organized a meeting between its head, Erard Corbin de Mangoux, and the Libyan authorities, in Tripoli. Corbin had come because France was setting up a system covering all of North Africa, with the aim of stemming the thrust of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

France was already helping Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Corbin had come to tell the Libyans that this “Sahel plan” was not directed against them but against the jihadist groups. The Libyan regime was also aware of the threat, moreover Abdallah Senoussi, who was in charge of security, was ready to help France. He knew that it was also in the interest of his country: AQIM had a katiba entirely made up of Libyan fighters, and that worried him.

To read

Libya: where have the pro-Gaddafi gone?

You honestly admit that you did not see the fall of the regime coming, pointing out that the Libya of 2011 was neither Tunisia nor Egypt, and that Gaddafi was neither Ben Ali nor Mubarak. What did you mean?

For me, at the time the regime was stable. Compared to Tunisia and Egypt, Libya was a very large but sparsely populated country, completely held by the authorities: every citizen was observed, the population was small enough to be controlled. Kadhafi was not Ben Ali either: he governed with an iron fist, without qualms. Moreover, Kadhafi had not been afraid of the Jasmine Revolution. On the other hand, when the events in Tahrir Square began in Cairo, he was much more attentive to them.

You depict Libya in 2011 as follows: “Ethnic rivalries, competition between soldiers and civilians, distance from the command center of the National Transitional Council (CNT), competition between Gulf sponsors, lack of arms and ammunition…” What is -what has changed today?

Nothing has really changed. And what I’m absolutely certain of is that it was the Gaddafi regime that managed to hold it all together. Cyrenaica is traditionally separatist, there have always been tensions with Tripolitania, including during the time of King Idris. Always, except during the reign of Gaddafi.

Let’s be clear: the “Guide” was not my cup of tea, but the fact is that he had succeeded in silencing the divergent interests of the different tribes, and that during his forty years at the head of Libya, real progress has been made in education, health… And he had put Islamism under a bushel. So I’ll say it again: for me, it’s incomprehensible that Sarkozy wanted to pay for his scalp. Yes, Gaddafi was putting a spoke in the wheels of France. But it also helped all the Sahelian countries.

To read

“Gaddafi and I”, by Jean-Louis Gouraud

After having had to evacuate the French embassy in Tripoli, you worked for a time in Tunisia, at the time of the revolution. Are you surprised by the current state of the country and the turn taken by the Kaïs Saïed regime?

In 2011, at the time of the revolution, I really thought what Tunisia would go for the better. Even if we knew that Islamism had solid foundations there, as in Egypt, I saw people who really wanted change, including in rather privileged circles who had no reason to complain about the system in place. People projected themselves, they thought that Tunisia was going to become a free country… So perhaps the hardening set in motion by the current power is only temporary. Let’s hope so.

You mention the role played by Qatar in the fall of the Libyan regime. Today, major diplomatic maneuvers are underway in the Arab-Muslim world. Can this have an influence on the situation in Libya?

I think that all the states in the region – Qatar, United Arab Emirates… – play an important role, but the key player remains Turkey. For the Turks, Libya is their garden, it is a central area for them. Wagner’s presence can also play a role, on the margins.

To read

Libya: Moussa Koussa non grata in Qatar?

You have crossed paths with Seif el-Islam, the son of the late “Guide”, who now has presidential ambitions. What kind of man was he? Is his surname today an asset or a handicap for his compatriots?

The vast majority of the population was born under Gaddafi, and the “Guide” remains an idol for many. So bearing the name of Gaddafi can be an asset. Seif el-Islam was presented as the family reformer, especially compared to his brother Moatassem, who was more conservative and close to the military.

For me, he is very good in communication, while his brother was more of a man of action, but he is far from having the aura of his father. The future will tell if his name is a real asset, but I think it will all depend on the people he is surrounded by. As for Khalifa Haftar, he played very badly by alienating the entire population of the West, where he himself comes from.

To read

Libya: Seif el-Islam Gaddafi’s networks of influence

In France, former President Nicolas Sarkozy and several ex-ministers are currently threatened with a trial by judges who evoke a “corrupt pact” with the Gaddafi regime. Looking back, would you say that sheds light on some of the events you experienced in Libya?

What I can say is that at my level, and even if we heard things, we never received an order from the Élysée at the time. Our boss, Corbin, was presented as a loyal Sarkozist. Maybe he received instructions on the Libyan file, sincerely I don’t know.

To read

Libya: should Gaddafi be overthrown?

There is today a certain rejection of France and its presence in many countries on the continent, and relations between Paris and the three Maghreb countries are difficult. Do you think, as is sometimes said, that the intervention in Libya is one of the causes of this rejection?

What is indisputable is that France maneuvered badly. It was caught in multiple and headwinds, among which there was this Libyan tornado which surely accelerated the phenomenon. The countries of the Sahel were the first victims of the destabilization of Libya, and then it widened.

Nor should we overlook the growing influence of countries like China or Russia. But it is true that in the Maghreb the situation is difficult. To speak only of the work of the intelligence services, the relationship has always been complicated with Algeria, it was sometimes complicated with Tunisia… But today, we see that it is especially with Morocco that it is is degraded.

* The man from Tripoli. Secret Agent Memoirsby Jean-François Lhuillier, Mareuil editions, 2023.

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