Turkey and Azerbaijan spent six weeks in the autumn of 2026 closer to an open rupture than at any point in their three-decade alliance — and then, on November 8, patched it up with warm words at a victory parade.
The warmth, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies reports, papered over a dispute that neither side has actually resolved.
The crisis, detailed in a new policy brief published in Arabic by the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, began with headscarves and escalated into a fight over Israel, sovereignty and who leads the Turkic world.
Between late September and early November, Baku barred Turkish politicians and journalists from entering the country, opened legal proceedings against seven people living in Turkey, and skipped a summit in Ankara. For two countries bound by the 2021 Shusha Declaration — a framework that approaches a mutual defence pact — this was unprecedented.
Headscarves at the school gate
The trigger was secular. Between July and October 2026, Azerbaijani authorities introduced measures to reinforce secular education. The rules never explicitly banned the hijab, the Centre for Studies notes, but their implementation effectively did: female students and teachers were denied entry to schools, and teachers were pressured to remove their headscarves or leave their jobs.
The measures provoked anger and protests inside Azerbaijan. In Turkey, they struck a nerve that runs deep. Conservatives in Ankara saw an echo of the 1990s, when Turkish state offices and schools imposed their own restrictions on religious dress — restrictions Erdoğan’s own movement spent two decades dismantling.
The Azerbaijani president declared that his country had won its war against Armenia independently and bought its military equipment without outside assistance — a pointed statement, given that Turkish advisers helped organise Azerbaijan’s armed forces and planned and conducted the 2020 war that restored its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Erdoğan’s adviser speaks — and pays for it
On October 12, an adviser to President Erdoğan criticised the restrictions, arguing that ideological considerations could not justify denying girls an education. Baku’s ruling New Azerbaijan Party fired back, defending its ties with Israel and warning against foreign interference.
Israel became the crisis’s second front — and, for Turkish observers, its most telling one. Azerbaijan invited Israeli President Isaac Herzog to a regional summit in Baku, arranged his official transportation and gave him a warm reception. Erdoğan stayed home, sending Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan instead.
Turkish commentators read Baku’s hospitality toward Israel — amid the Gaza war and steadily deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relations — as a deliberate signal to Ankara. Azerbaijani media returned fire, criticising Erdoğan’s absence and accusing Fidan of encouraging opposition to Aliyev’s government. Turkish politicians, for their part, linked the hijab restrictions directly to Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel.
Baku opened legal proceedings against seven people living in Turkey, accusing them of inciting religious hatred and advocating the violent overthrow of the constitutional order. It also barred 31 Turkish citizens — politicians and journalists among them — from entering the country.
The summit Aliyev skipped
On October 30, the Organisation of Turkic States met in Ankara. Aliyev did not attend, sending his foreign minister instead. Erdoğan avoided a public confrontation. And the adviser who had criticised the hijab measures resigned before the summit — reportedly at the presidency’s own request, to appease Baku.
Erdoğan flew to Shusha on November 8 for Azerbaijan’s Victory Day celebrations, at Aliyev’s invitation. The presidents exchanged warm statements reaffirming their alliance. But the Centre for Studies is blunt about the outcome: the meeting did not resolve the dispute’s causes.
Israel’s hand, or Baku’s own house?
Two explanations for the crisis have emerged, and they point in very different directions.
The first attributes it to pro-Israeli elements within Azerbaijan’s ruling establishment, seeking to weaken ties with Turkey and pull Baku into Israel’s geopolitical camp. Supporters of this reading point to Azerbaijan’s public defence of its relationship with Israel, calls to reconsider its position on Cyprus, and claims that Azerbaijan no longer needs Turkish guidance.
The relationship with Jerusalem is substantial: the two states have maintained diplomatic relations since 1992, Israel supplies a substantial share of Azerbaijan's advanced military imports, and Azerbaijani oil meets a large portion of Israeli demand. Some Turkish observers suggest the Shusha reconciliation was made easier by Netanyahu’s electoral defeat and the prospect of a new Israeli government more interested in better relations with Turkey.
The second explanation keeps the story at home. Under this reading, the hijab restrictions aimed to curb the influence of religious figures connected to Iranian seminaries — a real concern for a secular government governing a predominantly Shia population that has long distrusted Tehran — rather than to alienate Turkey or accommodate Israel.
Baku’s sharp response to Turkish criticism, in this view, reflected nationalist sensitivities and a determination to assert its independence, not a geopolitical realignment.
Where the alliance goes from Shusha
What the crisis exposed, whatever the true motive, is structural. Since Aliyev succeeded his father in 2003, Azerbaijan has consolidated authority and kept a firmly secular orientation, building its foreign policy around security concerns and regional competition.
Distrust of Russia’s role in its conflict with Armenia and wariness of Iranian influence pushed Baku toward Ankara. Over two decades that grew into an alliance spanning defence, energy and trade, with pipelines connecting Azerbaijani energy to Turkey and European markets, and Turkish weapons and expertise underpinning the 2020 victory.
The shared interests extended to geography: both countries back the proposed Zangezur Corridor, which would connect mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and Turkey, giving Ankara a shorter route to Central Asia.
How Ankara intends to handle that challenge remains, as the Centre for Studies puts it, uncertain.