2023-04-23 07:41:43
Raghda Dergham wrote in “An-Nahar Al-Arabi”:
Jurisprudence and interpretations abound in attempts to understand the Arab rush to rehabilitate Syria in the wake of the Saudi-Iranian agreement under Chinese sponsorship and guarantees, bearing in mind that the first steps of the great openness to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad preceded the tripartite event undertaken by the UAE, while Egypt has sought for some time to pave the way for the return of the Syrian regime to League of Arab States. Where does Assad’s relationship with Russia, Iran and Hezbollah lie in the terms and conditions of this return? Are provisions formulated today for a road map that leads to an integrated deal, and not just a cosmetic celebration of Assad’s return to the Arab fold?
Saudi Arabia will host the Arab Summit next month, and it has started to prepare the agenda for the summit with pragmatism that accompanies vision, as the Saudi leadership has adopted it with its new approach. Those who know the Saudi performance realize that it is far from improvisation, and that Riyadh’s messages are coherent, even in their brevity or ambiguity. According to a Gulf diplomat well versed in the affairs of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Gulf diplomacy, especially Saudi Arabia, builds its policies within its concept of the limits of the possible and the limits of the impossible.
He believes that the fear of dividing Syria and of increasing Iranian, Russian, and Turkish influence is the driving force behind the Gulf rush to rehabilitate Assad, and that the road map includes practical ideas to improve internal conditions, save the Syrian opposition, and reduce Iranian influence “within the limits of what is possible, and gradually.”
The veteran diplomat adds that the Gulf countries will not accept the strengthening of Assad if he does not open up to the opposition and improve internal conditions, and this message is clear to Damascus. As for relations with Iran, the Gulf believes that the opportunity is available to reduce Iran’s influence in Syria, gradually, with the approval of Bashar al-Assad, because the continuation of Iranian control does not serve Syria, nor does it serve Assad, nor does it serve the Alawite sect.
In other words, Bashar al-Assad needs to gradually escape from the Iranian grip, because he is not able to control Syria under Iranian hegemony. Accordingly, he may find in restoring Arab engagement a means of saving him after he became embroiled in his total dependence on Iran and Russia, but gradually, and within the framework of a regional deal.
What the Arab countries offer to Assad includes a pledge to rebuild Syria with Arab funds, and for the end of isolation from Syria to be a bridge for Syria to the world. It also includes collective action to gradually contain Turkish influence, not just Iranian influence. In the Gulf opinion, the Arab presence in Syria reassures the Syrians, and it is in the interest of Assad to move to the category of reassuring his people instead of continuing the enmity with him. All this in return for the “commitment” shackled by Assad. These are bargain items, not a picnic mood.
What is required of Assad in terms of his relations with “Hezbollah”, with whom he fought against the Syrian opposition and has become an actor and partner on the ground with Iran and the regime in Damascus, is a gradual “disengagement” as part of the deal. The Gulf view is that Syria, and not only Iran, must ensure that Hezbollah does not expand in the Arab countries, and that this requires the head of the Syrian regime to gradually “disengage” between him and Hezbollah. In the words of a former Gulf official, Hezbollah is a “phenomenon” that has been around for a long time.
A Russian source familiar with Iranian thinking towards Syria and towards the Saudi-Chinese-Iranian tripartite agreement believes that Iran will allow some political change in Syria, and that Russia does not mind because Moscow sees Syria as a burden today and it needs to focus on the Ukrainian war. His information is that Iran will give up some of its influence, but not its military presence in Syria.
What is remarkable about this source’s information is that Iran is considering how to turn Hezbollah into a “political tool” instead of remaining a “military revolutionary tool.” how? The former Russian diplomat says that the regime in Tehran is studying how to develop and deepen the “integration” of “Hezbollah” and its partners and followers like Tehran “into the political life” of the concerned country.
This is possible if the integrated deal is agreed upon. Hezbollah, in the opinion of the Gulf states, is a destructive enemy for them and their security, and curbing it is a basic need in the deal and understandings.
Why would Tehran accept such a radical change? The Gulf and Russian opinions agree that Iran needs to get out of the gloomy economic situation, the nuclear crisis that makes it vulnerable to military confrontation, and political isolation. Therefore, it may accept the necessary concessions within the framework of the normalization deal with the Gulf countries and the consequent economic rescue, as well as the possibility of the United States opening up to lifting sanctions on it, if it implements its obligations and radically moderates its behavior.
President Joe Biden’s administration is partially dissatisfied with these developments in the Middle East, where China appears to be in the lead, but in reality it is not entirely displeased. The reason is that this administration welcomes anything that enables it to avoid military confrontation with Iran.
Moreover, the Gulf patronage to divert Syria’s path towards the Arab environment, away from Russian, Turkish, and Iranian influence, is something Washington does not object to, on the contrary. This is in addition to the Biden administration’s welcome that the Arab countries replace the “Astana” process, which includes Russia, Turkey and Iran, in sponsoring internal political solutions in Syria, especially towards persuading Assad to make concessions to the opposition.
Israel is important to the Biden administration in the Syrian equation if the efforts of Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel succeed in creating an atmosphere that leads to Syria’s gradual joining in the process of comprehensive disengagement from Israel and reaching the stage of peace and normalization. This is because the broader and deeper title of the strategy of effective Gulf states is to move away from confrontations, address differences and resolve conflicts in the entire Middle East region, gradually and with qualitatively new diplomacy.
Saudi diplomacy made clear its aspirations at the level of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, when he spoke at the FII conference in 2019 about a “dream” that he intends to turn into reality, a dream of transforming the Middle East into a new Europe far from ideological conflicts and extremist policies. Then, at the conclusion of the Jeddah Security and Development Summit with the participation of the leaders of the countries of the Cooperation Council, the United States, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan about a year ago, he affirmed a vision that prioritizes achieving security, stability and prosperity, calling on Iran to cooperate with the countries of the region to be part of this vision. Saudi Arabia’s hosting of the Saudi summit in May constitutes an important date within the framework of the pragmatic implementation of the vision, especially in the wake of the Saudi-Iranian-Chinese agreement, and Syria constitutes a test station.
If expectations are true about Bashar al-Assad’s readiness to replace his dependence on Russia, Iran and “Hezbollah” with his openness to internal reform, dialogue with the opposition and opening the doors of Syria for the return of Syrian immigrants to it, Gulf diplomacy will have caused a revolution in al-Assad’s thought and strategy. Regardless of whether Al-Assad pushed for this radical change, or if he was pushed to it, its results, if truly and honestly adopted, will be of benefit to Syria and Gulf diplomacy. But the lesson is in the implementation.
It will not be easy for Assad, even if he is convinced, to seek permission to separate from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is a strategic partner for him and his father. Russia may give him permission to be relatively independent from it because the Arab initiative toward him is wanted by Russia and has sought after it, and because Russian-Gulf relations have expanded and Russian interests require focusing on the oil markets instead of sticking to what today has become a burden on it, while yesterday it was a strategic priority.
Iran is more sophisticated and clever, and the Revolutionary Guard is not ready to break its contract with the regime in Damascus, nor with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Therein lies the problem. The matter is more complicated because Iranian control of Syria is a strategic goal of the regime in Tehran, and the leaders of the Revolutionary Guards are not eager to participate in implementing the decline of Iranian influence in Syria.
“Gradually,” say those who read between the lines of the integrated deal that is being studied and is still being prepared. Well, let slowness be a compass towards confidence. Let confidence be the compass of the exam.
1682239697
#Gradually #basis #understandings #road #map #Syria