Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States military has yet to fully absorb the conflict’s central lesson: that industrial-age fundamentals — mass, attrition, and the ability to hold territory — still decide wars, not just drones and artificial intelligence.
The assessment comes from a discussion hosted by War on the Rocks featuring Michael Kofman and Dara Massicot of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Amos Fox of Arizona State University. The panel argued that Washington’s fixation on technological novelty has obscured the reemergence of campaigning — the orchestration of sequential operations over time and space — as the decisive military skill.
Technology as adjunct, not replacement
Unmanned systems and AI have undeniably reshaped the battlefield, the analysts acknowledged. Yet they function as enablers for a war still fought with artillery, infantry, and fortified lines. “Old-fashioned ideas like campaigning, holding territory, mass, and attrition still decide wars,” the discussion summary says. The ability to generate and sustain combat power over months, not days, remains the prerequisite for strategic success.

Institutional learning gap
The panel pointed to recent U.S. military performance in confrontations with Iran as evidence that the institutional learning loop may be broken. Despite four years of observation, American planning assumptions continue to privilege rapid, precision strikes over the grinding logistics and manpower cycles that define the war in Ukraine. The disconnect suggests the Pentagon is observing the conflict without reorganizing to fight like it.
Campaigning versus raids
Kofman, Massicot, and Fox distinguished between raiding — striking targets for immediate effect — and campaigning, which links tactical actions to operational objectives that accumulate toward a political end state. Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive and Russia’s 2024 pressure on the Donbas both illustrated how difficult sustained offensive campaigning has become against dense minefields, layered air defenses, and electronic warfare. The U.S. force structure, optimized for expeditionary raids, lacks the depth for protracted land warfare.
Mass reasserts itself as binding constraint
Mass — the sheer volume of munitions, platforms, and trained personnel — has reasserted itself as a binding constraint. Russia’s ability to regenerate forces through mobilization and defense-industrial expansion has allowed it to absorb catastrophic losses and continue attacking.
Western stockpiles and production lines, by contrast, have struggled to match Ukrainian expenditure rates. The analysts warned that without a credible mobilization framework and surge capacity, the U.S. cannot credibly deter or fight a peer adversary in a war of attrition.
Attrition as the default
The panel emphasized that attrition is not a fallback but the default mode of great-power war. Maneuver opportunities exist only when attrition has degraded the enemy’s coherent defense. American doctrine’s preference for maneuver warfare risks misreading the conditions required to create those opportunities. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that attrition must be planned, resourced, and sustained — not improvised after maneuver fails.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, founded in 1910 by Andrew Carnegie with a $10 million endowment of first mortgage bonds, has grown into a network of 170 scholars spanning Asia, the Middle East, Europe, India, and the United States. Its first president, Elihu Root, a former Secretary of War and of State, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912 while leading the organization.
In the University of Pennsylvania’s 2019 Global Go To Think Tanks Report, it was ranked the number one think tank in the world. The Endowment’s early work included building libraries in war-damaged cities in Belgium, France, and Serbia, and establishing the Hague Academy of International Law in the Peace Palace at The Hague in 1923.
Unresolved questions
Whether the U.S. defense establishment will translate these observations into force structure, procurement, and doctrine changes remains open. The 2024 National Defense Strategy acknowledges the return of great-power competition but does not explicitly commit to the scale of land forces or industrial base expansion the analysts describe. The next defense budget cycle will test whether the lessons of Ukraine are institutionalized or archived.