NATO has quietly picked its theory of victory for a war with Russia — and the Alliance hasn’t agreed on it.
On October 12, 2026, U.S. Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, told the Warsaw Security Forum that all 32 members had signed off on a classified strategy called “Block, Blunt, Break” roughly three months earlier.
Yet as Small Wars Journal reported, the command reshuffle that preceded it left Washington in practical control of the warfighting hierarchy, while Europe’s eastern flank builds for a very different war than the one the plans assume.
The divergence isn’t academic. Small Wars Journal’s reporting describes an Alliance that has answered, unevenly and by accident, the question its reform debates keep deferring: what does defeating Russia actually look like? Eastern-flank Allies are fortifying borders around a positional, attritional reading of a Russian contingency. France and Germany remain structured for an expeditionary, maneuverist one. One Alliance, two theories of victory.
“We will block the initial attack. If the attack persists, we will blunt it and prevent enemy advance. And if required, we will break the enemy’s forces and the operational warfighting system that is arrayed against us.”
He framed the public unveiling as reassurance for anxious populations after months of suspected Russian drone incursions and sabotage, and stressed that NATO remains a defensive Alliance. The classified version, he said, had been agreed by all 32 members.
A reshuffle that changed less than it seemed
Back on February 6, NATO announced that European Allies would take on new leadership roles across the Command Structure, and the move was widely read as a step toward European strategic autonomy. Small Wars Journal’s analysis cuts against that reading.
The chair of the Military Committee — the post most often cited — has been held by a European for most of the Alliance’s existence, and the agenda-setting power proved limited. Real warfighting authority runs through SACEUR, an American by tradition and design.

The same announcement contained a quieter reversal one paragraph down. Command of NATO’s three Joint Force Commands rotates among the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Poland — but the United States now leads all three theater component commands, keeping Allied Land and Air Commands and newly taking Allied Maritime Command. As Small Wars Journal put it, that is a quiet consolidation of command posts.
The Pentagon’s parallel moves point the other way, at least on the surface. Between late 2025 and 2026, it downgraded its service commands in Europe — Air Forces Europe-Africa and Army Europe-Africa — from four-star to three-star billets, framed as part of a broader reduction in general officer positions. An impending force posture review suggests retrenchment. But by holding the component commands, Washington retains decisive control over how the Alliance would actually fight.
Small Wars Journal’s lede problem is blunt: without a strategic foundation, elevating European officers amounts to political posturing. The reporting describes European efforts stuck between symbolic reshuffles and broad institutional debates — a European pillar, an EU army, an expanded Joint Expeditionary Force — at the expense of realistic assessment of actual war scenarios.
Two theories of victory, one Alliance
The maneuverist theory depends on dislocating an enemy through speed, movement and surprise — the American way of war, executed through American control of air, land and sea commands. Small Wars Journal notes it could remain viable in a Russian contingency, provided American enablers hold.
Sensors have made the tactical battlefield visible, but visibility is not transparency: Ukraine’s Kursk incursion showed intent can stay hidden. Armor survives too, when synchronized with electronic warfare, drone screens and suppressive fires.
The risk is what Small Wars Journal, citing scholar Olivier Schmitt, calls doctrinal entrapment. The most politically comfortable arrangement for Europe — an American SACEUR alongside reduced but real U.S. support — lets European capitals import American doctrine, targeting frameworks and high-tempo maneuver designs without fielding the sovereign capabilities to sustain them.
Schmitt and colleagues observe the theory of victory would survive “in form, if not always in substance” if Washington withheld its enablers. Freedman’s short-war fallacy then applies: plans built around swift victory tend to produce the prolonged wars they were meant to avoid.
Eastern-flank Allies have stopped waiting. For a Pole or a Balt, Small Wars Journal reports, positional defense is less a tactical preference than a rejection of the alternative — ceding towns to a Russian advance in the hope of retaking them, and risking each one becomes another Bucha.
Polish officials interviewed for a 2025 Ifri study described revising Poland’s plans after Bucha, away from elastic defense and toward a forward defense that keeps Russian forces, and similar atrocities, off national soil. The same logic now dominates in the Baltic states.
The force structures show it. Poland fields roughly 220,000 personnel excluding reservists — about 155,000 professionals — against a 2039 target of 500,000, though officials counted only about 2,000 active reservists in 2024. Its 476 tanks dwarf France’s 215, the UK’s 213 and Germany’s 209. Finland can mobilize roughly 280,000, and its more than 1,500 artillery pieces outnumber France’s 92. Small Wars Journal adds the caveat: neither is a full-spectrum force, and both made deliberate trade-offs.
| Force | Tanks | Artillery |
|---|---|---|
| Poland | 476 | — |
| France | 215 | 92 |
| United Kingdom | 213 | — |
| Germany | 209 | — |
| Finland | — | 1,500+ |
The fortifications follow the same logic. Poland’s East Shield covers 700 kilometers of border with Kaliningrad and Belarus. Estonia has begun procuring 600 modular bunkers under the joint Baltic Defense Line, which officials describe as designed to defend from “the first meter of national territory.” The most striking step: the coordinated withdrawal of the Baltic states, Finland and Poland from the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines.
The American baseline the plans still assume
Underneath it all sits a planning assumption that may not hold. According to a Bruegel report published last year, cited by Small Wars Journal, NATO planners assume that in a Russian attack on a European Ally, the 100,000 U.S. troops already in Europe would be rapidly joined by up to 200,000 more, concentrated in armored units suited to the East European battlefield.
The politics of that drawdown remain unresolved — Washington removed an Army brigade from Romania while adding manpower in Poland, Lithuania and Estonia.
Here the two outlets’ framings diverge sharply. Heritage reads Grynkewich’s speech as a marked shift away from trading space for time — the Cold War posture that let forces fall back hundreds of kilometers from the Fulda Gap before generating combat mass — and as a confident, escalation-conscious signal to Moscow.
Small Wars Journal sees an Alliance whose war plans still presuppose American mass, organized for a swift maneuver campaign while possessing the force structure only for a protracted, grinding one. Both can be true. The question is which reading the next crisis vindicates.
The alliance whose strategy Grynkewich unveiled was founded in 1949, when twelve states signed the North Atlantic Treaty in the aftermath of World War II, committing under Article 5 to treat an armed attack on one member as an attack on them all. Its Cold War purpose was deterring the Soviet Union, whose satellite states answered with the Warsaw Pact in 1955.
The Article 5 commitment has been invoked only once — by the United States after the September 11 attacks — leading to NATO’s war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the alliance has grown to 32 members, with Finland and Sweden among the newest, and its combined militaries number about 3.5 million personnel.
What remains unresolved is whether the eastern flank’s fortifications and the new strategy’s “block” phase describe the same war. Grynkewich’s classified text won unanimous approval; the doctrine behind it, Small Wars Journal’s reporting suggests, has not settled the argument over who fights, where, and on whose enablers.
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