The tension between those two facts is the story.
Small Wars Journal reported this week that Europe’s push for more senior posts inside NATO’s command structure has not produced a shared answer to the only question that matters: how, exactly, would the Alliance defeat Russia? A theory of victory, the outlet explains, is “a causal story about how to defeat an adversary.” Right now, NATO is running several at once.
Here is why that matters beyond the conference rooms of Brussels. War plans shape force structures, and force structures shape defense budgets — which in turn ripple through arms markets, munitions supply chains and the transatlantic investment climate.
When the Alliance’s biggest members disagree on whether the next war will be a fast maneuver campaign or a grinding positional one, they buy different armies. Investors in Europe’s booming defense sector are, in effect, betting on one theory or the other.
General Alexus Grynkewich, the U.S. Air Force officer serving as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, put the official line at the Warsaw Security Forum: “We will block the initial attack. If the attack persists, we will blunt it and prevent enemy advance. And if required, we will break the enemy’s forces and the operational warfighting system that is arrayed against us.”
General Grynkewich notes a classified version had been agreed by all 32 members roughly three months before his speech.
A reshuffle that changed little
The public story began in February, when NATO announced that European Allies would take on new leadership roles across the command structure. It was hailed as a step toward European strategic autonomy. Small Wars Journal’s analysis is blunter: the Military Committee chair has been European for most of NATO’s existence, and agenda-setting power proved thinner than hoped.
But there is a catch, buried a paragraph down in that same announcement. As the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Poland rotate command of the three Joint Force Commands, the United States takes over all three theater component commands — keeping Allied Land and Air Commands and adding Allied Maritime Command. Washington still holds SACEUR too. On paper, more European stars. In practice, the warfighting hierarchy remains American.

The Pentagon’s parallel moves read like retrenchment — it downgraded its Europe-Africa air and army service commands from four-star to three-star billets between late 2025 and 2026 — yet the component-command grip tells a different story. Small Wars Journal’s verdict: outward drawdown, retained operational control.
Two theories of the same war
The maneuverist theory — defeat Russia through speed, movement and dislocation — is the one NATO’s structure is built around. Its viability is contested. Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk and its ongoing Operation Vivaldi showed that pervasive sensors reveal equipment but not intent; visibility, Small Wars Journal argues, is not transparency. Armor has adapted rather than died, surviving when synchronized with electronic warfare and drone screens.
Western European capitals, structured for expeditionary warfare, still assume American enablers will be there. Olivier Schmitt, cited in the report, identifies the current arrangement — an American SACEUR plus reduced but real U.S. support — as Europe’s most politically comfortable option.
Comfort, though, breeds what the report calls doctrinal entrapment: European forces trained to execute an American way of war they cannot sustain alone. Should Washington withhold its enablers, the theory of victory would survive, as Schmitt and his colleagues observe, “in form, if not always in substance.”
Freedman’s short-war fallacy haunts that arrangement: plans built around swift victory tend to produce the prolonged wars they were meant to avoid.
The eastern flank stops trading land for time
Poland and the Baltics have reached the opposite conclusion. For a Pole or a Balt, Small Wars Journal reports, positional defense is not a tactical preference but a refusal — the alternative is ceding towns to a Russian advance and risking that each becomes another Bucha. Officials interviewed for a 2025 Ifri study described Poland abandoning elastic defense after Bucha, and the same logic now predominates in the Baltic states.
The hardware follows the doctrine. Estonia is procuring 600 modular bunkers under the joint Baltic Defense Line, designed to defend from “the first meter of national territory.” Poland’s East Shield covers 700 kilometers of border with Kaliningrad and Belarus. And in the most striking step, the Baltic states, Finland and Poland jointly withdrew from the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines.
The numbers make the split visible:
| Country | Tanks | Artillery |
|---|---|---|
| Poland | 476 | — |
| Finland | — | more than 1,500 |
| France | 215 | 92 |
| United Kingdom | 213 | — |
| Germany | 209 | — |
Poland fields roughly 220,000 personnel excluding reservists — about 155,000 professionals — against a 2039 target of 500,000, though officials counted only about 2,000 active reservists in 2024. Finland can mobilize roughly 280,000 through conscription. Both, Small Wars Journal cautions, are deliberate trade-offs, not full-spectrum forces.
The American baseline nobody can escape
Underneath it all sits a planning assumption few capitals can plan around. According to a Bruegel report cited by Small Wars Journal, NATO planners assume that in a Russian attack on a European Ally, the 100,000 U.S. troops already in Europe would be rapidly joined by up to 200,000 more, concentrated in armored units.
The politics of that drawdown remain unresolved: Washington removed an Army brigade from Romania while adding manpower in Poland, Lithuania and Estonia.
What the two outlets disagree on is tone. Heritage frames Grynkewich’s speech as reassurance — a defensive signal to Moscow and a balm for anxious eastern populations after months of drone incursions and sabotage.
Small Wars Journal frames the same architecture as an unresolved contradiction. Both can be true: Block, Blunt, Break promises to hold ground from the first meter, which is precisely what the eastern flank demanded, while the enablers that would deliver it remain singularly American.
Small Wars Journal, the outlet behind that analysis, is itself part of the story it tells. Its name comes from the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual of 1940, and its daily publishing continued without interruption until Dilegge’s death in April 2020, after which the Small Wars Foundation’s board kept the enterprise alive.
The question that will decide which theory prevails is not on any summit agenda. It is whether the fortifications rising along the Suwałki Gap are backed by forces that could actually maneuver — or only by plans that assume someone else will.