The Philippines is no longer content to be a passive participant in the global trade architecture. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Manila is actively seeking to reshape its role from rule-taker to rule-shaper, a strategic pivot that could redefine Southeast Asia’s economic diplomacy in an era of rising protectionism and supply chain fragmentation.
This ambition was made explicit in recent remarks by Trade Secretary Alfredo Pascual, who told The Manila Times that the country wants a “more assertive role” in world trade, particularly within the World Trade Organization (WTO). The statement comes amid growing frustration among developing nations that the multilateral trading system has failed to deliver equitable outcomes, especially as wealthier economies increasingly resort to unilateral measures and mega-regional deals that bypass the WTO altogether.
For the Philippines, this shift is not merely rhetorical. It reflects a deeper recalibration of economic statecraft—one that blends traditional export-led growth with new ambitions in services, digital trade, and green industrial policy. But to understand why Manila is pushing now, and what it hopes to achieve, requires looking beyond the headlines to the structural pressures and historical patterns shaping its trade posture.
The Long Shadow of Import Substitution and the Quest for Strategic Autonomy
The Philippines’ trade policy has long oscillated between openness and insularity. In the 1950s and 60s, import substitution industrialization (ISI) dominated, aiming to build domestic industries behind high tariff walls. By the 1980s, debt crises and inefficiencies forced a pivot toward liberalization under structural adjustment programs. The country joined the WTO in 1995, embracing globalization with optimism—but the benefits were uneven.
While nations like Vietnam and Bangladesh leveraged low-cost manufacturing to integrate into global value chains, the Philippines struggled with infrastructure deficits, bureaucratic hurdles, and a reliance on low-value electronics assembly and overseas remittances. Today, exports account for roughly 30% of GDP—half the ratio seen in Vietnam or Thailand—highlighting a persistent gap in export competitiveness.
Now, Manila is attempting to break this cycle not by returning to protectionism, but by asserting influence over the rules that govern trade. As Pascual emphasized, the goal is to ensure that WTO reforms reflect the realities of developing economies, particularly in areas like special and differential treatment (S&D), fisheries subsidies, and e-commerce.
“We’re not asking for charity,” Pascual reportedly said in a closed-door briefing with ASEAN trade officials in March. “We’re asking for a seat at the table where the rules are written—so they don’t keep being written against us.”
Fishing Subsidies and the Test of Multilateral Credibility
One concrete arena where the Philippines is seeking to lead is fisheries policy. The country is among the world’s top fish producers, with over 1.6 million Filipinos employed in the sector, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority. Yet, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing—often fueled by harmful subsidies—has devastated marine ecosystems and undermined small-scale fishers.
The WTO’s Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, finally reached in 2022 after two decades of negotiations, bans subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. The Philippines ratified the agreement in early 2024, becoming one of the first Southeast Asian nations to do so.
But implementation remains uneven. A 2023 study by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) found that while many developing countries lack the capacity to monitor and enforce subsidy rules, wealthier nations continue to provide billions in capacity-enhancing support—often through indirect means like fuel tax exemptions or vessel construction grants.
Manila’s push for a more assertive role is both principled and pragmatic. By championing transparent subsidy reporting and technical assistance for developing nations, the Philippines aims to position itself as a bridge between environmental goals and developmental equity.
As Dr. Maria Socorro G. Diokno, a fisheries economist at the University of the Philippines Diliman, explained in a recent interview:
The Philippines has a unique credibility here. We’re not just advocating for weak rules—we’re living the consequences of disappointing ones. Our voice in WTO fisheries talks carries weight because we know what’s at stake: livelihoods, food security, and the health of our oceans.
Digital Trade and the Push for Inclusive Rulemaking
Beyond traditional goods, the Philippines is also targeting emerging trade fronts. With over 85 million internet users and a booming business process outsourcing (BPO) sector that generates $38 billion annually, the country has a vital stake in the future of digital trade rules.
Yet, current WTO discussions on e-commerce are dominated by proposals from the U.S., EU, and Japan that prioritize data free flows and restrictions on data localization—positions that could limit developing countries’ ability to enforce privacy, taxation, or industrial policies.
Manila is pushing back. In late 2023, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) submitted a proposal to the WTO calling for greater policy space for developing nations to regulate cross-border data flows in the public interest, particularly for consumer protection and cybersecurity.
This stance aligns with a broader coalition of African and Latin American nations advocating for a “development-sensitive” approach to digital trade. As noted by UNCTAD’s 2024 Digital Economy Report, developing countries risk being locked into rules that favor incumbent tech giants unless they actively shape the agenda.
“We’re not opposed to digital trade,” said Undersecretary Ruth Castelo of the DTI in a April 2024 briefing. “We’re opposed to rules that are written without us—and that lock us into dependence.”
Geopolitical Headwinds and the Limits of Assertiveness
Manila’s ambitions, still, face significant headwinds. The WTO’s consensus-based decision-making process gives outsized influence to major powers, and the organization has been largely paralyzed since the U.S. Blocked appointments to its Appellate Body in 2019. Reform efforts have stalled, and plurilateral agreements—like the Joint Statement Initiative on e-commerce—are increasingly bypassing the WTO altogether.
the Philippines’ own trade policy remains inconsistent. While advocating for multilateral reform, it has simultaneously pursued bilateral deals with the U.S., Japan, and the EU, and joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—a move critics argue undermines the very multilateral system it seeks to strengthen.
As Professor Julio Teehankee of De La Salle University observed:
There’s a tension in Philippine foreign policy: we want to lead in multilateral forums, but we hedge our bets with bilateral and mini-lateral deals. True assertiveness requires coherence—and that’s still missing.
Still, Marcos Jr.’s administration appears committed to raising the country’s profile. The Philippines hosted the WTO Public Forum’s regional outreach event in 2023 and has increased its diplomatic presence in Geneva. Trade officials now regularly speak in WTO committees—a shift from the past, when Philippine interventions were rare and often limited to statements of concern.
The Takeaway: Assertiveness as a Survival Strategy
The Philippines’ push for a more assertive role in world trade is not about grandstanding. It is a survival strategy in a world where the rules of globalization are being rewritten—not in Geneva, but in Washington, Brussels, and Beijing. For a mid-income country with limited leverage, influence in multilateral institutions may be the most cost-effective way to shape outcomes that affect its exporters, fishers, and digital workers.
Success will depend on whether Manila can translate its ambition into sustained technical engagement, coalition-building, and domestic policy alignment. It must back its rhetoric with capacity—in Geneva, in its agencies, and in its ability to bring concrete proposals to the table.
If it does, the Philippines could emerge not just as a participant in global trade, but as a voice for a more inclusive, rules-based system—one that works not just for the powerful, but for the millions whose livelihoods depend on fair and predictable trade.
What do you think: can a middle-power like the Philippines truly change the rules of the game, or is assertiveness in multilateral forums just another form of diplomatic theater? Share your thoughts below.
