The strategic landscape of Yemen is shifting as territorial control changes hands across multiple fronts, highlighted by Houthi losses in the east and a subsequent push along the Red Sea coast that advances the group closer to the Bab al-Mandeb strait. Early assessments suggesting that the regime faced imminent collapse in the east have proven premature, while recent territorial expansions indicate a pattern of consolidation rather than a movement in free fall.
Blocked Airliners and Coalition Airstrikes
The current military escalation began in July 2026, when the Houthis attempted to bypass the blockade on Yemeni airspace by chartering an Iranian airliner for a roundtrip flight between Sanaa and Tehran.
Saudi Arabia has maintained control over Yemeni airspace since launching its military campaign in 2015 to unseat the group, restricting air traffic into Sanaa. These limitations tightened further in 2025 after Israeli strikes targeted Sanaa Airport and the group’s airliners in response to their use for transporting weapons and operatives. Despite these restrictions, United Nations flights have continued to operate without publicly declared cargoes or destinations.
Diplomatic Shifts and the Red Sea Campaign
Previous Houthi pressure tactics frequently yielded concessions from Riyadh, which sought an exit from the conflict prior to 2023. However, the Red Sea shipping campaign launched in November 2023 altered the diplomatic calculus for the kingdom.
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When the inbound flight from Tehran approached Sanaa on July 13, a coalition airstrike cratered the runway and forced the aircraft to divert to Hodeidah. In response, the Houthis declared a naval blockade against Saudi shipping and launched attacks targeting the kingdom’s energy infrastructure. Saudi Arabia answered with airstrikes on Houthi-held territory, while Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched a simultaneous offensive.
Conserving Resources in al-Jawf
Rather than collapsing under the coalition’s pushback, the Houthi leadership—largely composed of commanders in their 30s and 40s operating in a competitive environment—recalibrated their forces.
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In the northeastern governorate of al-Jawf, the group relinquished territory, including the al-Labanat military camp, without committing the resources necessary to retain the positions. While al-Jawf has historically served as a vital smuggling hub and a key entry point for overland materiel arriving via Oman, its challenging topography and unruly demographics have long presented governance difficulties. By accepting losses in the east, the movement conserved scarce resources to secure its core assets in the west.
The Capture of Mokha
This operational shift became apparent in western Taiz and southern Hodeidah.
On September 3, Houthi forces launched a ground offensive against the National Resistance Forces led by Tareq Saleh, the nephew of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Within a week, the key port city of Mokha fell to the advancing fighters. The captured coastline secures the group’s ports against land-based incursions and potentially expands smuggling routes via the Horn of Africa, while positioning forces near the city of Taiz itself. Nevertheless, because Houthi forces have maintained the capacity to threaten shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb strait for years, holding additional coastline does not fundamentally alter their existing maritime reach.
Anniversary Optics and Saudi Management
The timing of the western offensive coincides with a politically sensitive period for the administration in Sanaa. September marks the anniversary of the movement’s coup on September 21, 2014, an event the regime promotes while suppressing commemorations for the founding of the Yemeni Republic on September 26, 1962. The rapid capture of Mokha reinforces the regime’s narrative of continuous momentum, utilizing military displays to suppress open public dissent amid broader economic strains and declining state revenues.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia manages the conflict largely on its own after side-lining its Emirati partners and disbanding the Southern Transitional Council to consolidate influence over anti-Houthi factions. While this centralization grants Riyadh tighter control over local forces, the effectiveness of these management strategies remains unproven. As economic pressures mount and military maneuvers continue, the Houthi regime persists as an adaptive adversary capable of shifting its operational focus to maintain its position on the ground.
