Russia’s deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov reaffirmed Moscow’s “firm and unconditional” support for Cuba’s leadership at a meeting with Havana’s ambassador in Moscow on Tuesday, promising continued political-diplomatic and material assistance as US pressure escalates and the island endures a deepening energy crisis.
The meeting, confirmed by the Russian embassy and the TASS news agency, came with a striking gap between words and delivery. CiberCuba reported that Russia has managed exactly one oil shipment to Cuba all year — and that a second, announced in April, never arrived.
Here is why that matters. The gesture lands four days after a similar phone call, as Washington tightens sanctions and President Trump floats a “brief military campaign” against Cuba.
One tanker in ten months
The only Russian crude to reach Cuba in 2026 arrived on the tanker Anatoli Kolodkin, which docked in Matanzas on March 31 carrying 100,000 tons of Urals crude — about 730,000 barrels, according to CiberCuba. Cuba’s own ambassador to Moscow, Enrique Orta González, acknowledged in October that it was the year’s only delivery, and that it eased blackouts for roughly two weeks.
A second shipment announced in April never materialized. The tanker Universal changed course toward the South Atlantic in May and never reached the island.
Russian officials have quietly conceded the problem. Deputy foreign minister Alexander Alimov admitted in October that there were “logistical difficulties” in sustaining aid, partly attributable to Western sanctions complicating maritime transport. A document from the Russian Duma’s International Affairs Committee, dated November 6, went further: after Washington tightened restrictions in August, Cuba was left “practically” without fuel imports, according to CiberCuba.
| Russian oil deliveries to Cuba, 2026 | Status |
|---|---|
| Anatoli Kolodkin — ~730,000 barrels, Matanzas, March 31 | Delivered; only shipment of the year |
| Universal — announced April | Diverted to South Atlantic, May; never arrived |
The contrast is stark. Cuba’s Unión Eléctrica projected just 1,050 megawatts available against demand of 2,750 MW on Tuesday, with maximum shortfalls of 1,730 MW nationwide.
A diplomatic sprint under pressure
The Ryabkov meeting followed a pattern. On the previous Wednesday, Cuban first deputy foreign minister Gerardo Peñalver called Ryabkov — at Havana’s initiative — and received the same promise of “political and material assistance,” again without figures. The regime has also sent foreign minister Bruno Rodríguez to China and Vietnam as part of the same diplomatic offensive, CiberCuba reported.
Ryabkov repeated Moscow’s standing demands: an immediate end to the US commercial, energy and financial embargo, and Cuba’s removal from the American list of state sponsors of terrorism.
“Firm and unconditional support was expressed for the Cuban leadership and the people of the sister country in these difficult times,” the Russian embassy’s statement read.
Washington, meanwhile, has kept tightening the screws. On November 5, the State Department sanctioned eight entities, two individuals and five vessels linked to oil and military support for the Cuban regime — including Chinese firms such as China National Electronic Import and Export Company and Beijing H&C Technologies. A week later, Trump told an interviewer he would “without a doubt” consider a “brief military campaign” on Cuba before his term ends.
Words versus weight on the chessboard
Diario de Cuba, which has tracked ten months of Kremlin statements, frames the relationship as an increasingly weak alliance dressed in familiar rhetoric. It notes that foreign minister Sergei Lavrov used nearly identical language in a February call with Bruno Rodríguez, promising “firm willingness to continue providing Cuba the necessary political and material support.”
The outlet also draws a pointed parallel: Moscow did not ultimately stake its position on defending Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and Diario de Cuba argues Havana knows its Russian ally is unlikely to “leave the paved road for the dirt path” either — especially with Putin preparing to sit down with Trump and Xi Jinping in China as Ukraine talks proceed, according to DIARIO DE CUBA.
But there is a catch for Washington, too.
The next test is concrete. Whether a second Russian cargo ever reaches Matanzas — and whether Havana’s outreach to Beijing and Hanoi fills the gap Moscow’s logistics cannot — will show whether “firm and unconditional” support carries any tonnage behind it. As Diario de Cuba put it: “How long will Moscow keep saying it stands with Havana without that having practical consequences?”