Washington’s 1926 Diplomatic Gambit to Resolve the War of the Pacific
At the close of 1926, the United States floated a diplomatic gambit to untangle the territorial grievances left in the wake of the War of the Pacific: transfer the disputed provinces of Tacna and Arica to the administration of Bolivia. The initiative—crafted by U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg—ultimately collapsed when Peruvian diplomats rejected the idea while Chile did not pronounce itself in favor or against. Approximately at the end of 1926, the White House attempted to untangle the border frictions between Santiago and Lima after the 19th-century armed conflict through a curious formula, as the superpower tested various creative solutions.
The geopolitical puzzle had its roots in the 1883 Treaty of Ancón. That pact stipulated in its third article that a popular plebiscite would be held after ten years to determine whether Tacna and Arica would return to Peruvian sovereignty or remain under Chilean control. That vote did not take place because both nations failed to agree on the conditions and the form of the vote.
Protectorates, Plebiscites, and Behind-the-Scenes Interventions
Faced with this impasse, Washington attempted several creative interventions. According to Sergio González Miranda, a historian and recipient of Chile’s 2014 National History Award, the proposal to hand the territory to Bolivia was just one of several ideas on the table. Other American initiatives included shrinking the geographical area subject to the plebiscite or establishing a formal United States protectorate over the contested zone. As that plebiscite never managed to materialize due to bilateral disagreements, the North American superpower rehearsed various creative exits, as explained by the National History Award winner Sergio González, who is a professor at the University of Tarapacá, Iquique campus, and provided details of the international political context in an interview with BioBioChile.
November 1926: The Proposal and the Swift Diplomatic Fallout
The initiative materialized on November 30, 1926, through an official proposal from Secretary Kellogg documented by the U.S. State Department. Chile responded on December 4, 1926, when Jorge Matte informed Washington that the concept went beyond the concessions his government was prepared to make, though he did not reject it completely. Peru proved far less flexible. On January 12, 1927, Pedro José Rada y Gamio formally communicated his government’s rejection of the plan.
The maneuver left La Paz out in the cold. While Bolivia was interested in the prospect, Chilean diplomacy did not pronounce itself, while Peruvian leadership rejected it. The plebiscitary commission failed in 1927, and negotiations returned to square one. Frank B. Kellogg served as U.S. secretary of state between 1925 and 1929, and was recognized for his efforts to seek agreements not only in the region but also in Europe, where he promoted the signing of an international treaty for countries to renounce war as a national policy, which allowed him to win the Nobel Peace Prize.
The 1929 Treaty of Lima and the Sidelining of Bolivia
Direct talks soon followed between Emiliano Figueroa Larraín and Peruvian President Augusto B. Leguía. Those negotiations culminated in the 1929 Treaty of Lima, which partitioned the territories between Peru and Chile without holding a vote. Both societies were in agreement with the Treaty of Lima, effectively sidelining Bolivia—a dynamic later mentioned in the 2018 International Court of Justice ruling concerning Bolivia’s demand for a sovereign corridor to the Pacific.
A Trilateral Reality Sealed by Protocol
Though the 1929 treaty successfully resolved the bilateral sovereignty dispute, a supplementary protocol ensured that neither Chile nor Peru could transfer any portion of the former Tacna and Arica territories to Bolivia without the explicit consent of the other. That clause closed the door on unilateral adjustments, cementing a trilateral reality that continues to shape South American geopolitics today.
