LONDON (Archyde.com) – Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to publicly comment on the rapid withdrawal of Russian forces in northeast Ukraine. However, domestic nationalist forces are pressing to regain control of the war.
If what Western intelligence officials say and the analysis of public information is correct, Mr. Putin has little way to get things under control quickly. Most of the available tools carry risks, both domestically and geopolitically.
The most formidable opponents Putin has faced so far since coming to power in 1999 have been against Islamist forces in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, but in those campaigns he chose to build up his forces. .
Here are his main options in the war in Ukraine:
◎Stabilize the front line and counterattack after unit reorganization
Russian and Western military experts agree that, from the Russian standpoint, the Russian military needs to quickly stabilize the front line to stop the Ukrainian advance, reorganize its forces and, if possible, counterattack. The point is that it is necessary to develop a strategy.
However, among the Western countries, since Russia has lost a large number of troops in the battles with the Ukrainian army and has abandoned or destroyed a large amount of equipment, does it really have enough ground forces and weapons to deploy? It is questioned whether
Konrad Musica, head of Lochan Consulting in Poland, said that following the retreat of Russian troops from northeast Ukraine, “the force is depleted. “It hasn’t been delivered. I think the situation is only going to get worse because there are fewer people wanting to join the army. If Russia wants to increase its military strength, it needs to mobilize.”
◎National Mobilization
Russia can mobilize about 2 million reservists with military experience within the past five years, but training and deploying them will take time.
Cheong Wa Dae said on the 13th that national mobilization was not being discussed “at this point.”
Even if a general mobilization could win the support of nationalists, it would not be welcomed by ordinary adult men living in urban areas. They are reportedly reluctant to participate in the war.
A full-scale mobilization would force the government to revise its official message on the Ukraine issue, calling it an all-out war rather than a limited-purpose “special military operation.” The government’s policy of ensuring the daily lives of most Russians before the invasion of Ukraine would then have to be reversed.
A shift to all-out war would also pose a domestic political risk of public opposition to conscription. In addition, launching an all-out war against the same Slavic people would also make the Putin administration look bad.
Andrei Kruchunov, who heads RIAC, a think tank close to the Russian Foreign Ministry, has long said that the Russian government is reluctant to mobilize.
“Many people in big cities don’t want to go to war, so general mobilization is unlikely to be popular,” he said. I think it’s clear that it will be profitable,” he said.
Former British Ambassador to Russia Tony Brenton has said a full mobilization would take months to bring about a build-up of the Russian military.
◎ Expectations that Europe will be shaken by Russia’s energy strategy
Two Russian officials familiar with the thinking of the Kremlin’s office told Archyde.com last month what they expected Putin to do. He said he hopes this winter’s high energy prices and supply shortages will spur European powers to press Ukraine for a truce on terms favorable to Russia.
Some European diplomats, however, said that Ukraine’s recent military successes have made efforts by some European nations to persuade Ukraine to make concessions less meaningful.
And Germany and others have become more staunch in their stance on Russia in recent weeks, appearing more determined to weather the winter energy crisis.
◎ Expansion of missile targets
Russian forces retreating in northeastern Ukraine have turned to missile attacks on Ukrainian power installations. As a result, temporary power outages occurred in major cities such as Kharkiv and surrounding areas such as Poltava and Sumy. Water supplies and mobile communication networks have also been affected.
Such an operation would be applauded by some of Russia’s nationalist forces, who would want the Russian military to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure more permanently with cruise missiles. However, it may come under international criticism.
Russian nationalist forces have also long advocated attacking the Ukrainian capital Kyiv (Kyiv) and other “decision-making centers” elsewhere. If executed, it will inevitably lead to serious collateral damage.
◎Abolition or reduction of grain export resumption agreement
Putin has continued to complain that the U.N.-Turkey-brokered deal to resume Ukrainian grain exports is unfair to Russia and poorer countries.
Putin is scheduled to meet with Turkish President Erdogan this week to discuss amendments to the deal. If Putin wants to hit Ukraine immediately, he has the option of suspending or scrapping the deal, or not renewing it when it expires in November.
While the West and poorer countries in the Middle East and Africa will blame Mr Putin for exacerbating global food shortages, Mr Putin is expected to shift the blame to Ukraine.
◎Peace Agreement
The Russian president’s office intends to inform Ukraine of the terms for some kind of peace deal when the time is right. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, meanwhile, has vowed to use his military might to liberate Russian occupied territories.
Targets to be liberated by Zelensky include Crimea, which Russia forcibly annexed in 2014. Russia has repeatedly said that the Crimea issue is permanently settled.
Russia officially recognizes the pro-Russian powers of eastern Ukraine, the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic, as states, and ceding these territories to Ukraine seems politically impossible.
This is because Russia’s first “just cause” for its invasion of Ukraine was the total “liberation” of the persecuted pro-Russian population in these two regions.
Of course, Russia will have difficulty persuading domestic public opinion to return the partly controlled southern part of Ukraine. Southern Kherson Oblast is directly connected to the northern part of Crimea and is a strategic point that supplies most of the water needed for the Crimean Peninsula.
Kherson Oblast, together with neighboring Zaporozhye Oblast, also serves as a land corridor through which Russia can supply goods to Crimea.
◎Use of nuclear weapons
Several senior Russian officials have dismissed Western views that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Still, fear remains in the West.
The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons would not only cause extensive damage, but could also escalate the situation into a direct war between the West and Russia.
Russia’s nuclear doctrine permits the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a pre-emptive strike by nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction, or in the event that conventional weapons pose an existential threat to the state.
Mr Brenton, the former British ambassador to Russia, has warned that Mr Putin could use nuclear weapons if he were cornered and faced with a humiliating defeat.
According to Mr Brenton, given the choice between Russia losing, and losing badly, putting Mr Putin out of power, or avoiding such a situation by demonstrating the power of nuclear weapons, Putin’s government would be forced to do so. It is said that it cannot be asserted that it will not be used.
Ben Hodges, former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, acknowledged the risk, but said the odds of nuclear weapons actually being used were slim. “I don’t think Putin or his entourage will resort to self-defeating behavior because it doesn’t really give them an edge on the battlefield, and it’s impossible for the US to sit back and do nothing,” he said. ”.