If Benjamin Netanyahu loses power in the upcoming Israeli elections, Lebanon may emerge as one of the most directly affected players in the regional matrix. The potential exit of Netanyahu and his allies, specifically Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, could dial down the volume of official Israeli rhetoric and restore a measure of confidence between Tel Aviv, Washington, and European capitals. Yet, this does not mean that Israel will abandon its security objectives in Lebanon and Syria, nor will it become more willing to withdraw from areas it deems necessary for its security.
The Paradox of Post-Netanyahu Strategy
The paradox facing Beirut is that a post-Netanyahu Israel might become more capable of combining military rigidity with diplomatic flexibility. This hybrid approach could prove more difficult for Lebanon than facing a hardline government that stirs frequent disputes with its Western allies. The problem extends beyond the person of Netanyahu, but lies in the shifts caused by the recent war in Israeli society, and in the outlook on security, borders, and deterrence. After the October 7, 2023 attack, it is no longer sufficient for large segments of Israelis to wait for threats at the border or rely solely on defense systems. Instead, an approach has emerged based on thwarting threats before they arrive, and maintaining the army’s ability to operate inside opponents’ territories when necessary.
Consequently, the arrival of a figure such as Gadi Eisenkot, or the return of Naftali Bennett or Yair Lapid to power, does not guarantee a radically different policy toward Lebanon and Syria. While the tools and political language may differ, any new prime minister will work under the pressure of a public opinion more sensitive to security, and a military establishment demanding a wide margin to prevent the recurrence of similar attacks. Eisenkot, with his military background, might be more prepared to give diplomacy a role in converting military achievements into political results, and perhaps more capable of coordinating with the United States. However, he is unlikely to adopt an unconditional withdrawal if he does not see sufficient guarantees to prevent the renewal of threats. Bennett, coming from the right, represents a difference in managing rigidity rather than in its essence, while Lapid may seek to improve Israel’s image internationally without that meaning a fundamental change in the position on the weapons of “Hezbollah” or freedom of military action.
Border Friction and the Logic of Escalation
Security incidents along the Lebanese-Israeli border have implications that go beyond their field context, yet they cannot be treated as inevitable indicators of a new war. Amidst the attrition affecting the Israeli army, the political calculations of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and American and European preparations to rearrange the security landscape in the south, a phase is forming that exceeds the danger of renewed military confrontation to the nature of the settlement that might be imposed on Lebanon. Abdul Rahman Shehitli, the former head of the delegation negotiating the maritime borders, notes that Netanyahu may seek to exploit any security incident to achieve military or political gains, or to reshuffle the cards if electoral circumstances do not serve his interests. Lebanon appears to be a less costly arena, in light of the continuation of Israeli operations without corresponding military responses.
Almodon highlights that recent security incidents—such as explosives intercepted in Dahr al-Baydar—could be invested to present a narrative that “Hezbollah” continues to prepare for military operations, and that its activity constitutes a threat not only to Israel, but to internal Lebanese security as well.
Washington’s Fears and the Risk of Tactical Overreach
The United States is dealing with high seriousness with escalating Israeli security concerns regarding the possibility of “Hezbollah” resorting to rebuilding part of its military capabilities. These concerns focus on villages and areas located outside the direct field control of Israeli forces, opening the door to new scenarios for repositioning and forming new military deployment points in southern Lebanon. The Israeli concerns conveyed to Washington include the restoration of the missile arsenal and field infrastructure. In areas experiencing a security vacuum or the absence of an intense military presence, the Israeli side fears the return of elements to frontline villages with camouflaged and invisible methods, the establishment of miniature command and control centers and decentralized logistical warehouses that are difficult to monitor from the air, and the exploitation of rugged terrain to set up mobile, short-range launch platforms.
Washington considers these reports a real test of the extent of the current security arrangements’ resilience and the fragility of ceasefire lines. American diplomacy seeks to urge the concerned parties, including the Lebanese Army, to enhance oversight and ensure that geographic gaps are not exploited. According to a United Nations official with a military background, Israel is waiting for the smallest response from “Hezbollah” to proceed with a response in the south and all areas where the party and its supporters are deployed in the south and the Bekaa, reaching down to the southern suburbs. Furthermore, reports point to Israeli maps showing the state is working on paving a highway extending from the coast of Naqoura in the west to the Shebaa Farms toward the Golan and Mount Hermon in the east, to secure a sea-land bridge to move comfortably in this area. This project would lead to the elimination of the “Blue Line” and the removal of dozens of villages from the districts of Tyre, Bint Jbeil, and Marjeyoun.
