Apart from the dozens of dramatic pages that Schäuble devotes to the Greek and European crisis of the previous decade, a large part of his book is taken up by the criticism he makes of his colleagues within the party and, above all, of the chancellors he served – such as Angela Merkel.
In his biography, Schäuble does not fail to give some credit to Merkel, making it clear, however, that along the way their differences exceeded the points where they agreed. Initially, Schäuble states that it was “happiness” Merkel’s presence in Christian Democratic Party (CDU) in a period in which the previous Christian Democrat chancellor, Helmut Kohlbut also Schäuble himself, were shaken by the so-called “donation scandal”.
Kohl had admitted that, in the 1990s, he had received about 2 million German marks as a “donation” for his party, which he had not spoken about earlier because the donors did not want him to. For his part, Schäuble had stated that he accepted 100,000 German marks from the industrialist and arms dealer, Karlheinz Schreiber. Schäuble was then forced to resign from the chairmanship of the CDU as well as the leadership of his parliamentary group, where he had succeeded Kohl for about 2 years.
The advent, therefore, of Merkel, in which Schäuble recognizes “versatility” and “ability to deliberate and reflect”, was fortunate for the faltering party. Along the way, however, the differences between the chancellor’s leadership style and what Schäuble wanted to achieve began to become clearer. The two big “thorns” in their relationship were on the one hand the immigration crisis and, on the other hand, (what else?) h euro crisis.
In his memoirs, Schäuble accuses the former chancellor of “lack of vision” and strong compromise, greater than he would adopt. In his book, for example, Schäuble laments the wreck of his idea of a European monetary fund. “In 2010, I felt that the participation of the IMF was a capitulation by the Europeans, who they should solve their own problems”he writes.
“Or maybe my naive hope in the early stages of the European monetary crisis was to seize the opportunity for to create a monetary union with common financial, economic and social policies. I hoped to be able to develop the European Monetary Union into an economic union through its own monetary fund – similar to the IMF”he explains.
But as he points out, something like that “it couldn’t be done with Merkel” at the helm of Germany. “The pressures surrounding the Treaty of Lisbon, which had just painstakingly picked up the pieces of the failed European constitution, probably still hung over it.”Schäuble writes about Merkel. “She did not like the prospect of a rekindling of the dispute between European member states over the monetary fund, which would be accompanied by changes to the Treaty. Above all, she had no interest in the projected conflict with her own party and him [κυβερνητικό] coalition, in which skeptics of progressive European integration were strong”.
Still, Merkel could have dared, Schäuble reckons. As he points out, under Merkel, a governing majority of the CDU/CSU and FDP, which until then seemed unattainable, became possible – and not only did it become a reality, but it was also very strong. Merkel, however, did not want to dare and, as Schäuble says, “this is where our perception of political leadership differed”.
“The plan for the European fund, which I – even after my talks in the Eurogroup – thought could be implemented, went against the will of our chancellor, who held a special position among the rest of the heads of European governments”, says the politician. After all, the leadership of the German government coalition had already committed the finance minister to warn, or even seek the approval of the parliament, for all Eurogroup decisions. “The Chancellor did not support me in my bitter resistance to this. When I urged her to avoid it at all costs, she smiled politely at me.”he writes himself.
Another fact that seems to surprise or even bother Schäuble is the misconception that, between him and Merkel, the latter seemed to be the more “European”. As the former finance minister typically says, “the distorted image that was created of me as the “executioner” of the European idea really hurt me” and, as the 2015 crisis deepened, “the fact that I was more “European” compared to the chancellor was forgotten”.
Schäuble saw himself as one fighter for stability and Europe’s interests: “I see the fight for Europe as the main motivation of my long political career – especially at that time, when I hoped to be able to initiate long-overdue reforms to get out of the crisis”he writes.
His disagreements with Merkel reportedly brought the minister to the brink of resigning several times, only to be dissuaded by the chancellor herself. “At the height of the crisis, I never publicly opposed her opinion, but many times I reached the limits of what I could bear”, Schäuble characteristically emphasizes. Among the mistakes he attributes to Merkel is the management of immigration, where he believes that more security measures could have been taken, even with open borders.
On the part of Russia, Schäuble emphasizes that he always considered the decisions on natural gas pipelines wrong Nord Stream 1 & 2although, he admits, he too had underestimated Putin’s aspirations.
In conclusion, Schäuble omits to mention Merkel in his list of the most important chancellors of all time. As he points out, “the future will show what its place in history is”.
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