Khaled Abu Shakra – Nidaa Al Watan
The Lebanese official authorities soon opened the file of the displaced Syrians, until the international community closed it openly, and the Syrian regime was evading. The conclusions of this problematic file from the humanitarian, economic and security aspects hang on the political ambiguity of the future of Syria and the region. In this vein, the case continued as a racket for extortion at times, and trading in many cases, while all the Lebanese and some of the displaced pay the price from their pockets, their lives and the future of their families.
The World Bank’s classification of the Lebanese economic crisis in its Spring 2021 report as one of the three most severe crises in the world since the mid-nineteenth century, did not accompany the international community to ease the burdens of the displaced from this exhausted country. On the contrary, those gathered at the Sixth Brussels Conference on “Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region” on May 9, 2022, put “oil on an elderly” the complexity of their return. The official reaction to the position on “Brussels” was delayed for more than a month, as Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati announced during the launch of the “Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2022-2023” – that “11 years after the start of the Syrian crisis, Lebanon no longer has the capacity to bear all this burden, especially under the current circumstances.” Threatening to: “Expel the Syrians through the application of Lebanese laws firmly.”
Blackmailing the international community
At a time when this position appears to be to protect Lebanon, its aim is to “blackmail the international community to achieve material gains,” according to the former Minister of State for Displaced Affairs, Moeen Merhebi. In parallel with the Lebanese position, the UN Security Council was discussing aid to Syria, and the (donor) countries began preparing to set their budgets to support the Syrians in the areas of asylum. At this particular time, the official position of the state emerged, which distanced itself from what is happening by stopping the work of the Ministry of State for Displaced Affairs. She claimed the formation of a committee to follow up on the file, a problem previously and did not work to activate it during the last period, so the case remained a whirlwind in a cup. In Al-Marabi’s opinion, “If the state was serious about putting it forward, it would have taken the shortest and most effective path known, which is putting the international community in front of its responsibilities by stopping the causes of displacement and facilitating the automatic return of the displaced, represented by the presence of the Syrian regime, its Russian supporter, and Iranian militias.” Al-Marabi, who sees that the Syrians have expressed on all occasions their desire to return, put every drop of blood that flowed from them as a result of the increased incitement in the “neck” of President Najib Mikati.
logical solutions
Admittedly, “no country in the world can absorb the number of refugees who constitute 30 percent of its population, as is the case in Lebanon,” according to Wadih Al-Asmar, head of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights. But on the other hand, the state itself is the one who caused this problem twice, once by allowing the influx of this large number, and again by “not bearing responsibility for developing a comprehensive strategy to organize the refugee crisis.” The problem is dealt with improvisation, and without clear plans. Accordingly, the real discussion should focus on finding a real solution, and not by assigning responsibilities to the refugees, and turning them into a “scapegoat” in the collapse caused by the authority’s corruption and greed. In order to reach logical solutions, there are a number of steps that must be taken, according to Al-Asmar, including:
Separating the real refugees who are eligible for aid, from the displaced, or those who move between Lebanon and Syria. Thus preventing refugees from working and speculating on the Lebanese labor force. Or let them work and pump aid into the economy.
– Establishing laws to protect them and legalize their work. Obligating employers to register them in social security and to give them a work card allows the number of actual workers to be counted and the results to be sent to the General Commission for Refugees. Thus separating them from aid. On the other hand, workers are subject to taxes and fees collected by the state, just like the rest of foreign workers. At this stage, the cost of employing a Syrian refugee becomes equivalent to the cost of any worker, whether foreign or Lebanese, and there is no longer any preference given to them in employment.
Changing the political discourse, as it is impossible to respond to a request for aid to solve the refugee crisis if the core of the discourse always revolves around “throwing refugees into the sea, returning them to their countries against their will, or even drowning Europe with them.”
– Ensuring transparency and clarity regarding the aid that Lebanon has actually received since 2011, which exceeds the $9 billion that it declares. Especially since the annual aid over the past ten years ranged between 1 and 3 billion dollars.
– Issuing the real figure for the cost of the displaced, as the figure of 40 billion dollars may be exaggerated.
– Giving Syrian workers residency permits, renewed annually, in parallel with the development of the situation in Syria.
Agreeing to return them to their areas of origin, and not just throwing them into Syria. It was as if we would take the eastern Ghouta son to Deir ez-Zor, and Al-Halabi to As-Suwayda.
For his part, the founding member of the “Network of Researchers in International Affairs at the Research Center” (NORIA) and the political director of the National Bloc party, Naji Abu Khalil, believes that the first thing that requires solving the problem is recognition of its existence, and secondly, the availability of serious political will. These two factors can only be secured by putting pressure on the Syrian government, which holds the key to a safe and easy return. This is in contrast to previous attempts to return them, which were like a media show, and a large number of them were arrested in Syria upon their return.
As for economically, Abu Khalil believes that the need for Syrian labor in the sectors of construction, agriculture, etc., on which Lebanon has always relied, needs regulation and legalization. In the event of the opposite, the billions of dollars demanded by Lebanon will not benefit. Its reversal may be beneficial in the short term, but harmful in the long run for Syrians and Lebanese alike because it simply threatens the economy’s underdevelopment.
If European countries have their global standards in asylum issues, international and local organizations have their humanitarian approach, and parties have their political discourse, the reality on the ground has a different story. Tensions between displaced people and host communities have crossed red lines. More than 35 percent of those arrested for misdemeanors and felonies are Syrians. And the number of births they have exceeded those recorded for the Lebanese. And speculation on the work has reached its climax. The pressure on the infrastructure, such as water, electricity, roads and communications, has increased dramatically, and threatens to deprive everyone of it. And the huge number of displaced people compete with the Lebanese for bread and subsidized materials and take a large share of what is left of the depositors’ money.
In the face of these challenges, all concerned parties, especially the interior ones, are called upon to reach a responsible solution to the crisis away from populism, and the international community must put an end to the Syrian regime’s manipulation of the refugee issue to implement internal goals, not the least of which is the importance of changing the demographic face of Syria.