As demographic shifts sweep across Asia, the Philippines faces an urgent question over whether it can avoid the rapid aging crisis gripping wealthier neighbors like Japan and South Korea, where decades of heavy financial spending have failed to reverse shrinking populations and plummeting birth rates.
The stakes for the wider region and domestic workforce are becoming starker by the year. In Japan, the working-age population aged 15 to 64 peaked at roughly 87 million in 1995 before dropping to about 73.5 million. Roughly three in ten Japanese are now 65 or older, marking the highest share of any nation with a population exceeding 100,000. Despite Japan’s population shrinking for 17 consecutive years and spending more than three decades attempting to reverse the trend—including a pledge of about ¥3.5 trillion annually (roughly P1.6 trillion) since 2024—its fertility rate slid to a record 1.14 in 2025.
The economic footprint of this demographic transformation is visible across daily life. Adult diapers now outsell ones for babies in Japan, which currently contends with over 9 million vacant homes. South Korea is on a similar path. In 2024, its working-age population fell below 70 percent of the total population for the first time. After spending an estimated P17.5 trillion over 18 years to boost births, South Korea continues to grapple with gaps in emergency care and too few neonatal doctors for its already small number of newborns, leaving the country with a fertility rate of 0.80—among the lowest in the world.
Pronatal incentives aimed at encouraging an increase in the births of children, such as cash for new parents, better-paid parental leave, and housing help for young families, have not sparked a sudden surge in fertility rates. According to Ng, these financial measures are “not shooting up the fertility rate at all,” though she notes they remain valuable for children’s well-being and women’s workforce participation even if they cannot necessarily reverse a decline in population growth.
This demographic pressure is not restricted to wealthy economies. Based on World Bank and UN figures, Thailand transitioned into an aging society in 2004 when its gross national income per capita stood at P281,184. In 2025, just 416,514 babies were born there—the fewest since 1950—with deaths outpacing births by more than 143,000. Vietnam is not far behind. According to the World Bank, it began its aging transition in 2015 and is anticipated to reach aged society status by the mid-2030s, at which point 14 percent of its population will be 65 or older.
| Country | Milestone / Peak Year | Key Demographic Indicator | Recent Policy Spend / Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Korea | Working-age fell below 70% in 2024 | Fertility rate at 0.80; neonatal doctor shortages | Estimated P17.5 trillion spent over 18 years |
| Thailand | Became aging society in 2004 | 416,514 births in 2025 (fewest since 1950) | GNI per capita at P281,184 upon entering transition |
| Vietnam | Entered transition in 2015 | Projected aged society by mid-2030s (14% aged 65+) | World Bank transition timeline |
Across the broader Asian landscape, a 2024 Asian Development Bank report found that 40 percent of people over 60 have no pension, while about 60 percent don’t get regular health checks. Among workers 65 and older, 94 percent are in the informal sector. A similar reality applies to numerous Filipinos: individuals engaged in informal employment or working under contractual arrangements lack both savings and pensions.
Growing older will force many to rely upon their offspring as well as a strained public healthcare network. But there will be fewer children to lean on.
