Four and a half years after the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has secured no more than a slice of Ukrainian land, leaving half a million soldiers dead, its economy running on fumes, and its reliance on China growing ever stronger. Despite these heavy costs and the absence of any indication that Vladimir Putin is seeking peace, Ilya Budraitskis and Ilya Matveev examine the underlying drivers of this persistent conflict in their book, Russia’s New Imperialism, published by Stanford University Press at $26.
How Do Analysts Divide Over the Drivers of Russian Policy?
Analysts examining Moscow’s foreign policy generally split into two distinct schools of thought regarding the motivations behind the war. One camp characterizes Russia as a money-making mafia racket, populated by political entrepreneurs scrambling to anticipate what the Kremlin wants and make the most money for themselves as they go. According to this view, the ruling elite operates without grand ideological ambitions, driven instead by cynical self-enrichment and lawless capitalism.
Conversely, a second group of analysts identifies pervasive ideology as the primary engine of Russian statecraft. This perspective views the country as an imperialist and nationalist country packed with ideological zealots, bound by centuries of military culture and an enduring determination to subjugate its neighbors. Budraitskis and Matveev argue that these two seemingly contradictory positions actually represent two sides of the same coin. The authors maintain that the Kremlin’s aggressive ideology did not simply replace earlier cynicism; rather, that cynicism evolved directly into ideological zealotry through a continuous escalation of state antagonism.
What Role Did Post-Soviet Subcultures Play in Shaping Elite Behavior?
The roots of this aggressive worldview extend back to the chaotic aftermath of the Soviet collapse, during a period marked by a severe loss of faith in the Soviet system. Budraitskis and Matveev trace the evolution of two distinct subcultures that emerged during this era: vory v zakone, a parallel organized criminal caste that collaborated with Soviet bureaucrats in the 1980s before fighting to control the communist state’s assets, and patsany, urban street gangs that offered belonging, protection, and a sense of identity. Both groups operated under strict internal rules while viewing all outsiders with intense suspicion.
This social Darwinist environment fostered a pervasive belief that life was a perpetual conflict where survival depended exclusively on violence and the support of your closest male friend circle. The authors argue that this worldview shaped the behavior of the entire political establishment, including Vladimir Putin, establishing a baseline where might makes right and international relations are viewed through the lens of constant confrontation.
How Did Rational Economic Imperialism Shift into Ideological Conflict?
During the 2000s, Moscow pursued a form of capitalist imperialism that relied on economic methods and pursued economic goals. Budraitskis and Matveev describe this phase as an extension of the Kremlin’s wheeling and dealing approach on the global stage, even as Russian elites remained in hock to the Western economic system. However, this competitive mindset continuously generated friction, culminating in decisive military interventions designed to secure strategic assets.
As an example of this dynamic, the authors point to the 2008 war against Georgia, which the Kremlin undertook as part of a plan to weaken Tbilisi’s ability to participate in gas transit projects that bypassed Russia. Over time, as economic methods collided with geopolitical limits, the regime pushed its cynical, confrontational worldview to its absolute extremes, transforming rational economic maneuvering into an uncompromising imperial ideology that sustains the ongoing war in Ukraine.
